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Abstract
We argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged
by international capital markets on long-term debt. First, we present a model where the debt
maturity structure is the outcome of a risk-sharing problem between the government and bond-
holders. By issuing long-term debt, the government lowers the probability of a liquidity crisis,
transferring risk to bondholders. In equilibrium, this risk is reﬂected in a higher risk premium
and borrowing cost. Therefore, the government faces a trade-oﬀ between safer long-term bor-
rowing and cheaper short-term debt. Second, we construct a new database of sovereign bond
prices and issuance. We show that emerging economies pay a positive term premium (a higher
risk premium on long-term bonds than on short-term bonds). During crises, the term pre-
mium increases, with issuance shifting toward shorter maturities. This suggests that changes in
bondholders’ risk aversion are important to understand emerging market crises.
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d1I n t r o d u c t i o n
During the last decade, emerging economies have experienced recurring ﬁnancial crises. A common
factor across many of these crises has been a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities in the
aﬀected countries.1 There is broad consensus by now that when countries rely excessively on short-
term borrowing they are more vulnerable to sudden reversals of capital ﬂows and liquidity crises.
The risks associated with heavy reliance on short-term debt have prompted several authors to
suggest that countries should decrease their vulnerability to capital inﬂow reversals by lengthening
the maturity structure of their liabilities. This view is espoused in Cole and Kehoe (1996), Sachs,
Tornell, and Velasco (1996), Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Obstfeld (1998), Radelet and Sachs (1998),
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999), Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), and Feldstein (1999).
Why do emerging economies borrow short term despite its associated risks? In this paper,
we argue that countries borrow short term because it is cheaper than borrowing long term. In
particular, we show that international capital markets require a high risk premium when emerging
economies issue long-term debt, and that the required risk premium is especially high when crises
approach.2 Therefore, countries are forced to balance the cost of a liquidity crisis against the cost
of long-term borrowing. In this context, the observed debt maturity could simply be the result
of optimal risk sharing between the debtor country and investors holding emerging market bonds.
Empirically, we show that the cost of issuing long-term debt is, on average, higher than the cost
of issuing short-term debt, and the diﬀerence between the two is higher during periods of ﬁnancial
turmoil. Furthermore, we show that there is a negative relation between the relative cost of long
versus short-term borrowing and the maturity of new debt issued, i.e. when long-term debt becomes
relatively expensive countries issue more short-term debt.
In this paper, we use a simple model to illustrate our argument and present empirical evidence
consistent with our explanation. In the model, the optimal debt maturity structure and risk premia
1For example, large amounts of short-term debt had been accumulated by governments prior to the crises of
Mexico 1994-95, Russia 1998, and Brazil 1998-99, and by the private sector in Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand
before the 1997 East Asian crisis. According to central bank sources, the average maturity of outstanding government
bonds in Brazil was 1.7 years in 1998. In the cases of South Korea and Thailand, short-term debt (maturing at most
in ﬁve years) was, respectively, 97 and 60 percent of total corporate bonds outstanding in 1997.
2This paper is related to other papers in the international ﬁnance literature that have stressed the importance of
international investors to understand emerging market crises. See, for example, Calvo and Mendoza (2000), Kaminsky
and Reinhart (2000), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2003), and Chang and Velasco (2001).
1at diﬀerent maturities are endogenously determined. The model illustrates the trade-oﬀ between
cheaper short-term borrowing and safer long-term borrowing. On the one hand, investors are risk
averse and have a short horizon, so they may need to liquidate the long-term bonds before maturity.
As a result, they require a positive term premium to hold long-term bonds. On the other hand, it
is costly for the country to generate large amounts of liquidity (or ﬁscal revenue) in a short period
of time. Therefore, long-term debt is safer for the government because it reduces the expected cost
associated with rolling over short-term bonds.
The model has several implications. First, it shows that the risk premium on long-term bonds is
higher than the risk premium on short-term bonds, and that this diﬀerence increases during crises.
Second, the model shows what types of shocks are consistent with the observed pattern of maturity
choice and premia at diﬀerent maturities. A negative shock to government resources leads to an
increase in the risk premium on long-term bonds and an increase in the maturity structure of bond
issues. This is analogous to a positive demand shock on the market for international loans, leading
to higher prices and higher quantities of long-term bonds. A negative shock to investors’ wealth,
on the other hand, leads to an increase in the risk premium on long-term bonds and a decrease
in the maturity structure of bond issues. This is analogous to a negative supply shock, leading to
higher prices and lower quantities of long-term bonds.
Empirically, the paper studies the behavior of bond prices and quantities. To do so, we assemble
a new database on bond prices for several emerging economies. We use this database to estimate
time series of the term premium for each emerging market. In the process, we also estimate spreads,
bond returns, and risk premia at diﬀerent maturities, relative to Germany and the United States
(considered to be “safe” countries). We also study the characteristics of bond issuance by emerging
economies to understand the relation between the cost of borrowing at diﬀerent maturities and the
maturity choice.
T h em a i ne m p i r i c a lr e s u l t sc a nbes u m m a r i z e di nt h r e es t y l i z e df a c t s .F i r s t ,w h e nc o m p a r e dw i t h
Germany and the United States, the excess returns from holding emerging market long-term bonds
are, on average, much higher than those from holding emerging market short-term bonds. In other
words, there is a high “term premium” of around 4 percentage points per year, when comparing
3-year and 12-year maturities.3 This high term premium reﬂects the high risk premium required by
3To be precise, the term premium is equal to the diﬀerence between the risk premium an emerging economy pays
2investors to hold long-term debt relative to short-term debt. Second, the term premium is around
30 percentage points higher, on an annual basis, in crisis periods than in non-crisis periods. Third,
emerging economies issue relatively more short-term debt during periods of ﬁnancial turmoil, and
wait for tranquil times to issue long-term debt. This suggests not only that the high term premium
shortens the average maturity structure, but also that time variations in the term premium lead
countries to shorten their maturity structure even more during crises.
In sum, the theoretical and empirical results of this paper suggest that the “investor side”
is important to understand the joint behavior of risk premia and maturity structure of emerging
market debt. In particular, given our observation that the term premium increases, while the
maturity of bonds issued decreases during periods of ﬁnancial turmoil, we conclude that changes
in investors’ risk aversion play an important role in emerging market crises.
Three issues are worth considering when analyzing the results of this paper. First, the term
p r e m i u mi sn o tt h es a m et h i n ga st h ed i ﬀerence in spreads at diﬀerent maturities. The reason
is that emerging market debtors sometimes default on their debt. Observed spreads can then be
decomposed in two parts, a default premium and a risk premium. The default premium simply
reﬂects the probability of default at diﬀerent horizons. The risk premium reﬂects the fact that
investors need to be compensated for bearing the risk of default and for the price volatility associated
with bonds of diﬀerent maturity.4 The yields on long-term bonds may be higher than those on
short-term bonds either because the probability of default at longer horizons is higher or because
the expected returns required by investors are higher. To study the cost of borrowing at diﬀerent
maturities we need to identify these two components. We do this by estimating excess returns that
account for default episodes.
A second and related issue is that estimating the risk premium on defaultable bonds using
realized returns can be subject to a “peso problem,” given that defaults are relatively rare events.
However, because our primary objective is to study the diﬀerence between long and short-term
on long-term debt (relative to Germany and the U.S.) and the risk premium it pays on short-term debt (again,
relative to Germany and the U.S.). This diﬀerence can be called excess term premium, due to the comparison with
Germany and the U.S. To simplify, however, we will just use the expression term premium throughout the paper,
with the understanding that we study the yields that emerging economies pay on top of those charged to Germany
and the U.S.
4Chang and Velasco (2000) also make this distinction. They present a model where the term premium is zero
(bondholders are risk neutral) even though short-term spreads are lower than long-term spreads. In their model, the
probability of default on long-term bonds is higher than the probability of default on short-term bonds.
3risk premia, we argue that it is very unlikely that our results are aﬀected by a peso problem. The
bias aﬀe c t sb o t he l e m e n t so ft h ed i ﬀerence. Plus, if anything, the bias should aﬀect the returns on
short-term bonds more than those on long-term bonds, tilting the results against ﬁnding a large
term premium.5
Third, though our evidence points toward the importance of the investor side in understanding
short-term debt, other factors are also likely to be relevant in explaining the recurrent use of short-
term debt by emerging economies. In fact, several authors have emphasized the role of debtors,
arguing that short-term debt can alleviate moral hazard problems. The early literature, such as
Calvo (1988) and Blanchard and Missale (1994), focuses on the government incentive to lower the
real value of public debt by creating inﬂation. These papers show that this incentive is higher
when the debt is non-indexed, in domestic currency, and of long-term nature. More recent work
by Rodrik and Velasco (1999) and Jeanne (2000) show that opportunistic governments have less
incentive to default on their debt and more incentive to carry out revenue-raising reforms when
they have to meet early debt repayments. In this context, short-term debt serves as a commitment
d e v i c ef o rt h ed e b t o rt ol o w e rt h eb o r r o w i n gc o s t . 6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model that highlights the
trade-oﬀ between issuing short and long-term debt. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 studies
the behavior of the term premium. Section 5 analyzes the pattern of long and short-term debt
issuance. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
In this section, we present a model of the joint determination of the debt maturity structure and
the risk premium at diﬀerent maturities. The model describes the government of an emerging
economy that borrows from a set of international investors.7 We assume that it is costly for the
5As discussed below, in Section 4, our argument is that defaults generate larger losses on short-term bonds than
on long-term bonds. The reason is that long-term bonds usually trade at larger discounts during times of ﬁnancial
turbulence, while post-default workouts usually involve payments proportional to face value.
6Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) discuss the welfare consequences of short-term and long-term debt and
show that ﬁnancial underdevelopment can result in underinsurance from a social point of view and, thus, in too much
short-term borrowing.
7In the presentation of the model, we refer to bondholders as international investors, but the results apply more
generally to any environment where the government cares about borrowing costs. It is simpler to model bondholders
as international investors because in that case their utility does not enter the government’s objective function.
4government to raise a large amount of revenue in a short period of time. This assumption implies
that short-term borrowing may result in a costly liquidity crisis due to rollover diﬃculties. We also
assume that international investors are risk averse and have short horizons. These two assumptions
make investors sensitive to the price risk associated with long-term bonds.8
In this environment, the maturity structure of sovereign debt can be interpreted as the outcome
of a risk sharing problem between the government and bondholders. By issuing long-term debt,
the country lowers the expected cost of a liquidity crisis arising from rollover diﬃculties, but, at
the same time, it transfers risk to bondholders. In equilibrium, this risk is reﬂected in a higher risk
premium and lower bond prices, thereby increasing the cost of borrowing for the country. Thus, the
model allows us to analyze the trade-oﬀ between safer long-term borrowing and cheaper short-term
borrowing.
The model predicts that the term premium (i.e. the diﬀerence between the risk premium on
long-term bonds and that on short-term bonds) should be positive on average. Moreover, the term
premium should be higher during ﬁnancial crises. The model also predicts that debt issuance should
shift toward shorter maturities when crises are due to an increase in bondholders’ risk aversion.
On the other hand, debt issuance should move toward longer maturities when crises are due to a
decrease in the country’s expected repayment capacity.
2.1 Debtor country
There are three periods, dated 0, 1, and 2. In period 0, the government must borrow D0 to ﬁnance
old debt coming to maturity. The government can sell either short-term (one-period) or long-term
(two-period) bonds. In period 1, the government pays oﬀ the short-term bonds issued in period 0
and issues new short-term bonds. The diﬀerence between the two is covered by a short-run ﬁscal
adjustment. In period 2, which represents the long run, the government has access to a stochastic
and exogenous amount of ﬁscal revenue. This revenue is used to pay back maturing long and
short-term bonds, to reduce taxation, or for public spending. We abstract from strategic default
8Assuming short horizons is the easiest way of having investors care about short-run returns. Even if investors
were long-lived, they would also care about short-run returns if they were subject to liquidity shocks. The qualitative
results of the model do not depend on this modelling choice. For a discussion on the type of environment where price
risk matters, see Holmström and Tirole (2001).
5by assuming that the government repays its debt whenever feasible.9
In period 0, the government’s budget constraint is
D0 = pSDS + pLDL,
where DS and DL are the amount of short and long-term bonds issued in period 0, with pS and pL
being their respective prices.
In period 1, the government has to roll over the stock DS of short-term bonds. The government’s
budget constraint in period 1 is
DS = x + pS,1DS,1,
where DS,1 is the amount of short-term bonds issued in period 1, pS,1 is their price, and x is the
government’s primary surplus in period 1. Short-term bonds issued in period 1 are junior to existing
long-term bonds.
In period 2, the government’s potential revenue equals ˜ Y , which is a random variable that can
take two values, Y i nt h eg o o ds t a t ea n d0 in the bad state. The extreme case of zero realization
in the bad state simpliﬁes the analysis because it eliminates the possibility of partial default. As
of period 0, the probability of being in the good state is π0. In period 1, there is a shock that
aﬀects the probability of being in the good state. The updated probability is denoted by π.A s
of period 0, π is a random variable distributed on [π,π],w i t hm e a nπ0. As we show below, the
volatility of π introduces uncertainty in the government’s ability to borrow in period 1 and, thus,
on the required ﬁscal adjustment. Issuing long-term bonds in period 0 is a way for the government
to insure against this uncertainty.
The government’s objective function is
W = E0
 
−C (x)+m a x
 
˜ Y − DL − DS,1,0
  
,
where C(x) is a strictly convex function that represents the cost of the short-term ﬁscal adjustment.
9We are implicitly assuming that default is costly. The costs can be reputational, or involve direct interference
by creditors on debtors’ transactions in international goods and capital markets. See Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989) for a
discussion of the latter.
6We assume that C (0) = 0 and C  (0) = 1.S i n c eC is strictly convex, C  (x) > 1 for x>0.10 This
assumption, together with the assumption that in the long run the government’s marginal utility
is always equal to 1, results in short-run ﬁscal adjustments being more costly than long-run ﬁscal
adjustments. This diﬀerence can be explained by the fact that, in the long run, the government
can spread the adjustment over a longer period of time and thus achieve better tax smoothing, or
that by better preparing for the adjustment its associated cost can be reduced.
We assume that government resources satisfy π0Y − D0 > 0, so that, at risk-neutral prices,
the government is solvent with no need of ﬁscal adjustment in period 1. We also assume that the
government can carry out a ﬁscal adjustment large enough and faces a cost of default high enough,
such that it never defaults in period 1.11 When x>0, the country faces a rollover crisis.
2.2 Investors and bond prices
There are two overlapping generations of investors, period 0 and period 1 investors. Period t
investors invest in period t and consume in period t +1 . Both generations have mass 1. Period 0
investors have initial wealth w. They invest in three assets: an international risk-less asset, which is
oﬀered at price 1 (e.g. U.S. Treasury bills), and short and long-term bonds issued by the government
in period 0. Their preferences are represented by the utility function E0 [u(c)], where u(·) is
increasing, concave, and displays decreasing absolute risk aversion.12 Their budget constraint is
w = b + pSdS + pLdL,
c = b + dS + pL,1dL,
where b denotes holdings of the international risk-less bond, and dS and dL denote holdings of short
and long-term bonds issued by the country. Note that the period 1 budget constraint reﬂects the
10We are implicitly assuming that optimal smoothing of ﬁscal distortions between periods 1 and 2 is attained at
x =0 . It is easy to generalize the model to the case where C
 (x)=1is satisﬁed for x  =0 .
11This is likely the simplest setup in which the trade-oﬀ emphasized in this paper can be studied. The fact that
default never takes place in period 1 simpliﬁes the pricing of bonds in period 0. However, even if default in period 1
was allowed, short-term bonds would remain less risky than long-term bonds from the point of view of investors, since
the default would aﬀect both short- and long-term bonds. In addition, the fact that the ﬁscal adjustment in period 1
does not aﬀect ﬁscal resources in period 2 rules out multiple equilibria. The possibility of self-fulﬁlling “runs” would
increase the relative beneﬁts of issuing long-term bonds, but would not aﬀect the results qualitatively.
12This implies that lower levels of wealth are associated with higher levels of investors’ risk aversion. When referring
to negative shocks to the supply of funds, we use the two indistinctively.
7assumption that the government never defaults on short-term bonds issued in period 0.
Period 1 investors can purchase the international risk-less asset, short-term bonds issued in
period 1, and long-term bonds issued in period 0, with remaining maturity of one period. We make
the simplifying assumption that period 1 investors are risk neutral. As a result, bond prices in
period 1 are equal to the probability of the good state
pL,1 = pS,1 = π,
which does not depend on the debt maturity structure chosen by the government in period 0. This
simpliﬁes the government’s problem in period 0.
This setup reﬂects an environment where the market for emerging market debt is segmented
and investors are specialists, subject to liquidity shocks. Segmented markets result in bondholders
being more aﬀected by movements in the country’s bond prices than would be suggested by the
size of this market as a fraction of world assets. Therefore, the cost of borrowing is aﬀected by the
wealth and risk aversion of specialized investors.13 In addition, the existence of short investment
horizons makes investors sensitive to the price risk of long-term bonds, since they need to liquidate
t h e i rp o r t f o l i o si np e r i o d1 . 14
Using the market clearing conditions dS = DS,d L = DL, and bond prices in period 1, we can
obtain the consumption level of period 0 investors,
c = w +( 1− pS)DS +( π − pL)DL.
The period 0 ﬁrst order conditions are E [u  (w +( 1− pS)DS +( π − pL)DL)(π − pL)] = 0 and
1 − pS =0 . These conditions imply that bond prices satisfy E [u  (w +( π − pL)DL)(π − pL) ]=0 ,
what deﬁnes implicitly the price of long-term bonds as a function of DL, p(DL). This leads us to
the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The price of long-term bonds, p(DL),s a t i s ﬁes p(DL) ≤ π0, where the condition holds
as an equality if and only if DL =0 .F u r t h e r m o r e ,p(DL) is decreasing in DL.
13Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) also model foreign lenders as specialists with limited wealth.
14In a previous version of the paper, we considered a model with long-lived investors subject to liquidity shocks in
period 1. The results were very similar to those in this version of the paper.
8Proof: See Appendix A.





is generally positive. Since the risk premium on short-term bonds equals zero (they are risk-less),
the lemma also implies the existence of a positive term premium. The intuition behind this result
is straightforward. Shocks to expected revenues make the price of long-term bonds in period 1
volatile. Since investors care about short-run returns, they require a positive risk premium to
hold long-term bonds to compensate for this price risk. Since the degree of exposure to price risk
increases with DL,h i g h e rl e v e l so fDL lead to a higher risk premium and a lower price p(DL).15
It is useful to discuss the importance of diﬀerent assumptions for the results. The two assump-
tions necessary for the existence of a positive term premium are: the period 1 shock to expected
revenues and investors’ short horizon. If the shock to expected revenues occurred after period 1,
the price of long-term bonds would not change between periods 0 and 1, pL,1 = pL,s oi n v e s t o r s
would not require a positive risk premium to hold them. In addition, if investors did not care about
short-run returns, they would require the same risk premium to hold long-term bonds (between pe-
riods 0 and 2) as they would to hold short-term bonds (between periods 0 and 1, and then between
p e r i o d s1a n d2 ) .T h er e a s o ni st h a tb o t hs t r a t e g i e sw o u l dp a yo u tt h es a m ea m o u n ti na l ls t a t e s
of nature in period 2. On the other hand, the assumptions that no default takes place in period 1
and that investors are risk neutral between periods 1 and 2 substantially simplify the analysis of
the model, but are not necessary for the results. In a more general setting in which the country can
default in the intermediate period, the risk premium on short-term bonds would also be positive.
However, it would still be lower than the risk premium on long-term bonds, since the risk premium
on long-term bonds would reﬂect not only the default risk in the intermediate period, but also the
price risk.
15The yield on long-term bonds,
1−pL
pL , equals the sum of their risk premium,
π0−pL
pL , plus their default premium,
1−π0
pL .
92.3 Optimal maturity and risk sharing
We turn now to the choice of DL by the government. Using the bond prices derived in the previous
section, the government problem can be written as,16
max
DL,DS,DS,1,x
E0 [−C (x)+π(Y − DL − DS,1)],
s.t. D0 = DS + pLDL,
x = DS − πDS,1,
DS,1 ≤ Y − DL,
E
 
u  (w +( π − pL)DL)(π − pL)
 
=0 .
We can solve this problem backward, solving ﬁrst the optimization problem in period 1. The
maximum amount of short-term debt that the government can issue in period 1 is given by Y −DL,
w h i c hi sv a l u e da tπ(Y − DL).I f π(Y − DL) ≥ DS, the government can raise enough funds to
repay maturing short-term bonds without any ﬁscal adjustment. In this case, it sets x =0and
issues an amount DS,1 = DS/π of short-term bonds in period 1. The value of short-term liabilities is
constant over time and the government expected payoﬀ is π(Y − DL)−πDS,1 = π (Y − DL)−DS.
When π(Y − DL) <D S,aﬁscal adjustment is needed to avoid default. Since C (x) > 0 for
x>0,i ti so p t i m a lt os e tDS,1 to its maximum level to minimize the ﬁscal adjustment. The
government then sets x = DS − π(Y − DL) and the expected payoﬀ is −C(x).
The government’s objective function as of period 1 depends only on the value of its net resources
π(Y − DL) − DS.W et h u sd e ﬁne the government’s indirect utility function, V (·),a s




π (Y − DL) − DS if π(Y − DL) − DS ≥ 0
−C (−(π(Y − DL) − DS)) if π(Y − DL) − DS < 0
The function V (·) is increasing and concave. Using the fact that D0 = DS +pLDL, we can rewrite
16The constraint on DS,1 is due to the fact that short-term bonds issued in period 1 are junior to long-term bonds.
Without this constraint, the government could pledge all period 2 output to short-term bond holders. As a result, in
equilibrium the government would not be able to issue any long-term bonds in period 0.
10the government’s problem in period 0 as
max
DL
E [V (πY − D0 − (π − pL)DL)]
s.t. E
 
u  (w +( π − pL)DL)(π − pL)
 
=0 .
Written in this form, the government’s maturity choice in period 0 has the features of a risk-
sharing problem. The problem can be thought as one in which the government has a utility function
V (·) over period 1 “consumption,” needs to invest D0 in period 0 to ﬁnance a risky project that
pays πY in period 1, and borrows from risk-averse investors by issuing bonds that pay 1 in every
state (i.e. short-term bonds) and bonds that pay π (i.e. long-term bonds). The government’s
“consumption” level is given by
CG = πY − D0 − (π − pL)DL.
If the government issued only short-term bonds, it would hold all the risk and CG would be very
sensitive to π. Given the concavity of V (·), this volatility of CG would be costly, reﬂecting a higher
likelihood and size of ﬁscal adjustment. Thus, the government has incentives to issue long-term
bonds to transfer some of this risk to investors.17 However, investors require a risk premium to
bear the price risk associated with long-term bonds. Since investors’ period 1 consumption equals
w +( π − pL)DL,t h e i re x p o s u r et oπ is proportional to DL.T h e h i g h e r DL,t h eh i g h e rt h er i s k
premium required by investors and the lower the price pL. This implies that the expected level of
government consumption, which equals E[CG]=π0Y −D0 −(π0 −pL)DL, is decreasing in DL.A s
a result, the government trades-oﬀ the insurance beneﬁts associated with long-term bonds against
the lower borrowing cost associated with short-term bonds.
2.4 Comparative statics: supply and demand factors
We now characterize how the optimal maturity structure and the risk premium on long-term bonds
depend on the characteristics of investors and the borrower country. We refer to supply and demand
as supply and demand of funds in international capital markets: international investors are on the
17Note that dCG/dπ = Y − DL is decreasing in DL. In particular, when π(Y − DL) − (D0 − pLDL) ≥ 0 the
government is fully insured since CG ≥ 0 for all realizations of π.
11supply side and the debtor country is on the demand side. In particular, we consider the eﬀect of
investors’ risk aversion (captured in the model by their wealth w)a n dt h ee ﬀect of the country’s
expected repayment capacity (captured in the model by Y ). We focus on four limit cases.
Case I: Risk-neutral investors, high expected revenues
Assume that investors are risk neutral and government resources satisfy πY − D0 ≥ 0.I n v e s t o r s ’
risk neutrality implies that pL = π0. In addition, the condition on government resources implies
that
π(Y − DL) − (D0 − pLDL)=π(Y − DL) − (D0 − π0DL) ≥ (π0 − π)DL ≥ 0,
with the last inequality following from π0 ≥ π. As a result, independently of the maturity structure,
the risk premium on long-term bonds is zero and the government never needs to carry out a ﬁscal
adjustment in period 1. This case shows that when both investors’ wealth and the government’s
expected revenues are high, term premia are low and the maturity structure is undetermined. This
result reﬂects the fact that when investors and the government are both risk neutral, it does not
matter which one holds the risk.
Case II: Risk-averse investors, high expected revenues
Assume that investors are risk averse, while government resources still satisfy πY − D0 ≥ 0.T h i s
condition guarantees that if the government issued no long-term bonds and ﬁnanced D0 solely with
short-term bonds (DS = D0), it would never face a rollover crisis. Since investors would hold no
country risk, the risk premium on long-term bonds would be zero (pL = π0).18 If the government
issued a positive amount of long-term bonds, it would still avoid a rollover crisis in period 1 but it
would face a higher borrowing cost. Its payoﬀ would be
π0Y − D0 − (π0 − pL)DL < π0Y − D0.
As a result, any DL > 0 is suboptimal. This case shows that when investors’ wealth is low and
the government’s expected resources are high, term premia are low and the maturity structure is
18In this case, pL is the price of long-term bonds in the limit when DL → 0.
12short. This result reﬂe c t st h ef a c tt h a tw h e ni n v e s t o r sa r em o r er i s ka v e r s et h a nt h eg o v e r n m e n t ,
it is optimal for the government to hold the risk by issuing short-term bonds.
Case III: Risk-neutral investors, low expected revenues
Assume that investors are risk neutral, while government resources are such that πY − D0 < 0.
Investors’ risk neutrality implies that pL = π0.L e tˆ DL =
D0−πY
π0−π . If the government issued an
amount of long-term bonds DL ≥ ˆ DL,t h e n
π(Y − DL) − (D0 − pLDL)=π(Y − DL) − (D0 − π0DL)=πY − D0 +( π0 − π)DL ≥ 0.
In this case, the government would never face a rollover crisis.19 Any amount of long-term bonds
DL < ˆ DL w o u l dl e a dt oap o s i t i v ep r o b a b i l i t yo fr o l l o v e rc r i s i sa n dw o u l dt h u sb es u b o p t i m a l .T h i s
case shows that when investors’ wealth is high and the government’s expected resources are low,
term premia are low and the maturity structure is long. This result reﬂects the fact that when the
government is more risk averse than investors, it is optimal for the government to transfer the risk
to investors by issuing long-term bonds.
Case IV: Risk-averse investors, low expected revenues
Finally, assume that investors are risk averse, while government resources are such that πY −D0 < 0.
In this case, the government has to trade-oﬀ the cost of a rollover crisis associated with short-term
borrowing against the high borrowing cost associated with long-term borrowing. This leads us to
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. When investors are risk averse and government resources satisfy πY − D0 < 0,
there is an optimal amount of long-term borrowing DL ∈ (0, ˆ DL), the risk premium on long-term
bonds is positive (pL < π0), and the probability of a rollover crisis is positive.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The proposition states that when investors are risk averse and expected government resources
are low, the optimal maturity structure is an interior solution. By setting DL =0 , the government
19Note that ˆ DL ≥ 0 since the government’s expected revenue satisﬁes π0Y> D 0 and π < π0.I nt h ec a s ei nw h i c h
π =0 , ˆ DL =
D0
π0 and the unique optimum is to issue no short-term debt (DS =0 ).
13would not have to pay the risk premium associated with long-term borrowing, but it would face
a high expected ﬁscal adjustment cost in period 1 (when a large stock of short-term debt is to
be rolled over). By setting DL = ˆ DL, the government would completely avoid a rollover crisis in
period 1, but it would face a high borrowing cost in period 0. It is easy to see why the solution is
interior. At low levels of DL, investors are not very exposed to the country risk, so it is not very
expensive to increase DL. At high levels of DL, the country is well insured, so the cost of lowering
DL in terms of a higher cost from a rollover crisis is low. In addition, since investors are risk averse
and DL > 0, the risk premium on long-term bonds must be positive.
Supply and demand side crises
These four cases are summarized in Figure 1, where they are represented in the (w,Y) space. This
ﬁgure is useful to discuss the eﬀects of supply and demand side shocks on debt maturity and the
term premium.
A shift to the left reﬂects a reduction in investors’ wealth (or an increase in investors’ risk
aversion), which represents a deterioration of the supply side. The increase in investors’ risk aversion
causes an increase in the term premium and a shift toward shorter maturities, as the government
ﬁnds it optimal to transfer some of the risk from investors to itself. In the case of a shift from
region I to region II, this shift does not result in a rollover crisis, since expected repayment capacity
is high. In the case of a shift from region III to region IV, this shift does involve an increase in
the cost of a rollover crisis, since expected repayment capacity is low. Still, it is optimal for the
government to hold this risk because of the savings in borrowing cost associated with short-term
debt. Intuitively, a negative supply shock leads to lower quantities (less long-term borrowing) and
higher cost of borrowing (higher term premium).
A shift down reﬂects a reduction in the country’s expected repayment capacity, which represents
a deterioration of the demand side. The decrease in expected repayment capacity increases the cost
of a rollover crisis. As a result, the government ﬁnds it optimal to transfer some of the increased
risk to investors by shifting toward longer debt maturities, which results in a higher term premium.
In the case of a shift from region I to region III, investors have low risk aversion and thus are willing
to hold the additional risk without demanding a higher premium. In the case of a shift from region
14II to region IV, the shift toward longer maturities does increase the term premium since investors
are risk averse. Intuitively, a positive demand shock leads to higher quantities (more long-term
borrowing) and higher cost of borrowing (higher term premium).
2.5 Implications of the model
In the remaining of the paper, we empirically study the behavior of the term premium and bond
issuance by emerging market sovereigns at diﬀerent maturities. Due to the stylized nature of the
model, we test the main implications that seem likely to hold in any model where investor side
factors play an important role. In particular, we focus on whether there exists a positive term
premium, whether the term premium increases during crises, and whether the maturity of bond
issuance shifts during crises.
The model predicts that the term premium should be positive on average. It also predicts
that, during crises, the term premium should increase. This occurs either because of an increase
in investors’ exposure to country risk in the case of a demand side shock, or because investors
require a higher premium to hold the same amount of risk in the case of a supply side shock. The
predictions on the optimal maturity structure depend on the type of shock. While a demand side
shock causes the country to issue long-term bonds to shift risk toward investors, a supply side
shock causes the country to issue short-term bonds to shift risk away from investors and save on
borrowing costs. As a result, even though we cannot identify supply and demand side shocks, the
correlation between the term premium and the maturity of bond issuance allows us to establish
whether the predominant shocks are on the supply side (shifting the supply curve) or on the demand
side (shifting the demand curve).20
20In a more general setting, we would expect a demand side shock to aﬀect the wealth of investors through its eﬀect
on the price of bonds investors already hold. In this case, a demand shock would have the direct eﬀect highlighted
in the model, but also an indirect eﬀect on the supply side. As we show in the empirical section, crises are typically
associated with higher term premia and a shift towards shorter maturities. This comovement suggests that either the
predominant shocks are on the supply side or that, if they are on the demand side, their direct eﬀects are dominated
by their indirect eﬀect on the supply side. In either case, the results support the conclusion that supply side factors
play an important role in emerging market crises.
153D a t a
We now turn to the empirical evidence and analyze both price and quantity data. The price data
are used to estimate risk premia on short and long-term bonds, and to characterize the behavior
of the implied term premium. The quantity data are used to analyze the comovement between the
maturity structure of bond issuance and the observed term premium.
We conduct the empirical analysis by collecting data on sovereign bonds from the early 1990s
up to 2003 for eight emerging economies. These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico,
Russia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela. To calculate the term premium, we also collect data
on sovereign bonds for Germany and the U.S., which are assumed to be free of default risk. The
choice of emerging markets is constrained by data limitations. To estimate time series of the term
premium, we need enough foreign currency denominated bonds of diﬀerent maturities at each point
in time. Therefore, our sample corresponds to those emerging economies that borrowed heavily in
foreign currency, generating a rich enough pool of bonds. Furthermore, we restrict the sample to
sovereign bonds because they constitute the most liquid debt instrument in most emerging markets,
and because private debtors in emerging markets do not issue enough bonds to compute the term
premium.
We collect weekly (end-of-week) time series of bond prices, using all available bonds for each
country.21 We also collect other information on these bonds, including currency denomination,
coupon structure, and maturity. In addition, we compile time series of bond issuance in foreign
currency. For each bond, we collect the amount issued, currency denomination, and maturity date.
With this information, we construct weekly time series of amount issued valued in U.S. dollars. We
exclude from the sample the bonds with collateral and special guarantees, such as collateralized
Brady bonds and those issued by Argentina during the large pre-default swap. We also exclude
bonds issued during forced restructurings, like those issued by Argentina and Russia post default
and Uruguay post crisis.22 We collect data from three diﬀerent sources: Bloomberg, Datastream,
and J.P. Morgan.
Regarding the currency choice, we restrict the sample to bonds denominated in foreign currency
because it is not possible to construct the term premium by mixing bonds with diﬀerent risk
21We eliminate the observations where bond prices do not change over time, as this typically reﬂects no trading.
22See Duﬃe, Pedersen, and Singleton (2003) for more details on the Russian default.
16characteristics. (Consider that both default risk and currency risk would aﬀect the term premium
on domestic currency bonds.) This reduces the sample signiﬁcantly, given that many countries,
especially Asian and Eastern European ones, mostly issue domestic currency bonds. With respect
to the currency selection, we use bonds denominated in U.S. dollars, Deutsche marks, and euros for
the estimation of bond spreads. This choice is not very restrictive as most foreign currency bonds
are issued in these currencies. As benchmarks of risk-less bonds, we use those issued by Germany
in both Deutsche marks and euros and by the U.S. in dollars. We use bonds in all foreign currencies
f o ro u re s t i m a t i o n so fb o n di s s u a n c e .
Table 1 lists the countries in the sample, along with the time periods used for the price and
quantity data. The price data start in April 1993 (with a diﬀerent starting date for each country),
ending in May 2003 for all countries. The quantity data cover a longer time span, starting in
January 1990 and ending in December 2002. Table 1 also displays the number of bonds available to
calculate bond prices and the number of bonds issued during the sample period. For the price data,
the table shows the average minimum maturity, maximum maturity, and 75th percentile. Though
m o s tb o n d sh a v eam a t u r i t yo fl e s st h a n1 5y e a r s ,t h ec o u n t r i e si nt h es a m p l eh a v eb e e na b l et o
issue longer-term bonds with maturity of 20 and 30 years. The bottom panel of Table 1 displays
the average amount issued by maturity, showing that issuance is distributed across maturities.
Appendix Table 1 lists all the bonds used in the paper, specifying for each bond its characteristics
and whether it is used for the price and/or quantity analysis. The number of emerging market
bonds used in the paper is 466, while the total number of bonds (including German and U.S.
bonds) is 746.
4T e r m p r e m i u m
In this section, we show that, consistent with the model predictions, observed term premia on
emerging market bonds are positive and increase during crisis times. In the model, the risk premium
on short-term debt is set to zero for simplicity, so the risk premium on long-term bonds and the
term premium are identical. In reality, the risk premium on short-term bonds is also positive.
Thus, to obtain information on the term premium, we ﬁrst need to estimate the risk premia on
bonds of diﬀerent maturities.
17The risk premium for each maturity is estimated by using ex-post excess returns on emerging
market bonds over comparable default-free (German and U.S.) bonds. To calculate the risk pre-
mium, we need to obtain ﬁrst bond yields, spreads, and prices. We begin by estimating time series
of German and U.S. yields curves and emerging market spread curves. The maturity-τ spread, st,τ,
is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the yield, yt,τ, on an emerging market zero-coupon bond of
maturity τ and the yield, y∗
t,τ, on a default-free zero-coupon bond of maturity τ, st,τ = yt,τ − y∗
t,τ.
We use this information to obtain bond returns at diﬀerent maturities and over time for every
country. This enables us to make cross-country, cross-maturity, and over-time comparisons. Note
that it would be impossible to carry out the analysis using the raw data because each country has a
diﬀerent set of bonds at each point in time, with varying maturity and coupon structure. Appendix
B describes the methodology used to estimate yields and spread curves.
Figure 2 displays the estimated spreads over time for each country. The ﬁgure shows spreads
at two maturities to illustrate how short-term (3-year) and long-term (12-year) spreads move over
time.23 The ﬁgure shows some interesting facts. First, spread curves are, on average, upward
sloping. Second, spreads increase during periods of ﬁnancial crises. For example, during the crises
in Argentina, Russia, and Uruguay, spreads jump to more than 25 percent or 2,500 basis points.
Third, short-term spreads are more volatile than long-term spreads. In fact, during periods of very
high spreads there is an inversion of the spread curve, with short-term spreads becoming higher
than long-term ones.
Using the estimated spread curves and U.S. yield curves, we compute the price Pt,τ of a rep-
resentative emerging market bond of given maturity τ and coupon c. I nF i g u r e3 ,w ep l o tt h e
price of short and long-term bonds, with a semi-annual coupon of 7.5 percent.24 To simplify the
comparisons, the value at the beginning of the sample is normalized to 100 for each country. The
ﬁgure shows that the prices of long-term emerging market bonds are more volatile than those of
short-term bonds. In particular, at the onset of crises the prices of long-term bonds fall much more
than those of short-term bonds, while during the recovery, the prices of long-term bonds increase
much more than those of short-term bonds. Next, we show how these price changes are reﬂected
23Our methodology allows us to compute spreads at every maturity and, therefore, construct the entire spread
curve over time.
24For prices and returns, we choose to use coupon-paying bonds because emerging markets almost never issue
zero-coupon bonds. So the pricing errors for coupon-paying bonds are smaller than for zero-coupon bonds.
18in the risk premium and the term premium.
After having obtained prices, we estimate the risk premium using excess returns or, more
precisely, average ex-post excess returns over T periods.25 The return of holding an emerging
market bond, rt+1,t, for one period (one week) is equal to
Pt+1,τ−1−Pt,τ
Pt,τ , in the case of no coupon
payment at date t +1 . We compare this return to the return on a German or U.S. bond, r∗
t+1,t.
Excess returns, erτ, are then expressed as the returns of holding emerging market bonds of maturity
















Positive excess returns mean that emerging market bonds pay positive returns on top of what
German or U.S. bonds do. Note that the computation of excess returns does not simply use risk-
less bonds of the same maturity and coupon structure. In fact, we obtain excess returns by taking
into account the payment proﬁle of the emerging market bond, and comparing it to a portfolio of
risk-less bonds that replicates its payment structure.26
The term premium, tpτ2,τ1,i sg i v e nb yt h ed i ﬀerence between the risk premium (average excess
returns) on long-term bonds (of maturity τ2) and that on short-term bonds (of maturity τ1),
tpτ2,τ1 = erτ2 − erτ1.
Before going to the empirical estimates, two points are worth noting about the term premium.
First, a positive slope in the spread curve does not imply that the term premium is positive, since
the term premium also depends on the evolution of spreads over time and on how defaults aﬀect
bonds of diﬀerent maturities. Second, the diﬀerence in risk premium between long and short-term
emerging market bonds would typically reﬂect both the price risk associated with the probability
of default and the term premium inherent in default-free bonds. Here we concentrate on the ﬁrst
component, because we deﬁne the term premium on emerging market bonds in excess to the term
premium on default-free bonds.27
25To calculate the means, we use holding periods of one week. We also experimented with holding periods of one
month, obtaining similar results.
26See Appendix B for more details.
27Since the term premium for U.S. and German bonds is positive, the total term premium would be larger if we
194.1 Unconditional term premium
Table 2 shows average annualized excess returns across all observations in the sample. The table
displays values for bonds with maturities of 3, 6, 9, and 12 years and annual coupon payments
of 5, 7.5, and 10 percent (paid semi-annually). These “theoretical” bonds are representative of
emerging market sovereign bonds both in terms of maturity and coupons. Table 2 shows that,
when considering all the countries in the sample, excess returns are positive for all coupon sizes
and maturities. More relevant for our analysis, excess returns increase with maturity in all cases,
so the term premium is also positive.28 Not surprisingly, there is heterogeneity in the results at the
country level, reﬂecting the diﬀerent performance of each emerging market. However, the results
are not driven by any particular emerging market, since they survive when we exclude from the
sample individual countries.
What do the results in Table 2 tell about how much emerging market bonds pay relative to
comparable default-free bonds? To answer this question, consider the results for bonds with annual
coupons of 7.5 percent (the one closest to actual coupons). The results in Table 2 say that, on
average, investors receive an annualized return 3 percent higher when investing in a 3-year emerging
market bond than when investing in a German or U.S. 3-year bond, and an annualized return 7
percent higher when investing in a 12-year emerging market bond than when investing in a German
or U.S. 12-year bond. In other words, emerging market bonds pay a positive risk premium and a
positive term premium.
4.2 Term premium during crisis and tranquil times
We now study whether the term premium is diﬀerent during crisis and tranquil times. To do so,
we ﬁrst need to deﬁne crises. The literature has used diﬀerent deﬁnitions, with no deﬁnition being
perfect as certain ad-hoc criteria need to be adopted. To partly overcome this problem, we use
four diﬀerent deﬁnitions of crises to gauge the robustness of our results. Since we are interested
in studying conditional returns, we adopt deﬁnitions that use only ex-ante information. In other
words, to determine whether there was a crisis at time t, we only use information that was available
added the two components.
28Also note that excess returns decrease with coupon size. This is expected given that the term premia are positive
and duration is a decreasing function of coupon size.
20at time t.C r i s i s d e ﬁnition 1 is our benchmark deﬁnition; it sets the beginning of a crisis when
9-year spreads are greater than a threshold, which is deﬁned as the average spread over the previous
six months plus 300 basis points.29 The end of the crisis is at the end of the ﬁrst four-week period
in which spreads have remained below the threshold used to determine the beginning of the crisis.
Crisis deﬁnition 2 is similar to crisis deﬁnition 1, but uses 400 basis points to deﬁne the threshold.
Crisis deﬁnitions 3 and 4 are similar, but use a one-week period instead of a four-week period to
end the crisis.
Table 3 lists the crisis periods obtained with crisis deﬁnition 1. All major crises are captured
by the crisis deﬁnition. For example, the Mexican 94-95 crisis aﬀected Argentina and Brazil. (Note
that our sample does not contain spreads for Mexico during that period.) The Russian crisis aﬀected
all countries in the sample except Uruguay, which had its own crisis after Argentina defaulted on
its debt in early 2002. The Argentine crisis started when the government was forced to change its
economic plan and the default became very likely. Brazil and Colombia were also hit by crises in
2002.
Then, we calculate excess returns at diﬀerent maturities, splitting the sample between tranquil
times and crises. The results are reported in Table 4 for all crisis deﬁnitions. We report results using
bonds with coupons of size 7.5 percent, although the results are similar for bonds with coupons of
5 and 10 percent. The results indicate that both excess returns and the term premium are very
large during crises, and close to zero during tranquil times. For example, according to deﬁnition
1, the diﬀerence between the average 12- and 3-year annualized excess returns (our measure of the
term premium) is around 28 percent. Table 5 displays excess returns by country according to crisis
deﬁnition 1. The table shows that for most countries the risk premium and the term premium
are large during crises and low during non-crisis periods. There are two exceptions, excess returns
are negative during crises in Uruguay and, for short maturities, in Argentina. This is due to the
fact that both countries have experienced actual defaults, namely, crises in which the situation
continued to deteriorate rather than improve. In the case of Argentina, this is partly compensated
by the Mexican crisis, when excess returns were very high.
In Table 6, we analyze more formally whether excess returns across maturities are predictable,
29To classify the ﬁrst observations of the sample for each country, we repeat the ﬁrst price observed during the
previous six months.
21namely whether they change during crisis times. The table presents least squares regressions with
the long-short excess return as the dependent variable, deﬁned as the diﬀerence for each observation
between a long-term (9-year or 12-year) excess return and a short-term (3-year) or medium-term
(6-year) excess return. The independent variable is a dummy that takes the value one during crises
and zero otherwise. To make sure that the results are robust to our crisis deﬁnition, we also try log
spreads, deﬁned as log(1+st,τ),a td i ﬀerent maturities as the independent variable. The estimations
pool all observations available across countries and over time. Results with and without country
and time eﬀects are reported. The regressions use robust estimates of the standard errors. To
do so, we deﬁne clusters by the country and crisis indicators, thus, observations are assumed to
be independent across clusters, but not necessarily independent within clusters. This allows for a
general form of heteroskedasticity across observations and non-zero correlation within clusters.30
The results in Table 6 show that the crisis variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent level for all regressions. Since the coeﬃcient on the crisis dummy is an estimate of
the term premium, the results imply that the term premium is positive. The estimations also show
that the magnitude of the coeﬃcient is very large. For example, the regression for the 12-3 term
premium with no country or time dummies shows that the term premium increases by 0.449 percent
per week during crisis times, which on an annualized basis corresponds to more than 26 percent.
The coeﬃcient of 0.045 on the 6-year spread in the regression of the 12-3 term premium states that
when 6-year spreads increase by 1 percent, the annualized long-short excess return increases by 2.4
percent. Conﬁrming the evidence presented in the previous tables, these regressions imply that the
term premium is time-varying, increasing during periods of crises and high spreads.31
We have already shown that the term premium increases during crises. To estimate to what
degree this increase can be ascribed to an increase in the volatility of returns during crises, we plot
in Figure 4 the excess returns against the standard deviation of excess returns for crisis, non-crisis,
and all periods. The ﬁgure shows that during non-crisis periods excess returns are close to zero,
with the standard deviation increasing with maturity. During crisis periods, both excess returns
30As further robustness tests, we also estimated regressions with crisis dummies constructed with crisis deﬁnitions
2, 3, and 4. Moreover, we redeﬁned clusters using either country or crisis indicators. In all cases, we obtained similar
results.
31The fact that investors demand higher risk premia and term premia during crises implies that, at the onset of
crises, bond prices need to fall enough such that they become suﬃciently attractive to investors. In this sense, bond
prices, especially those of long-term bonds, “overreact” during crises.
22and their standard deviations increase for all maturities. It is important to note that the increase
in excess returns cannot be accounted for by the increase in volatility. The reason is that the
Sharpe ratio (i.e. the ratio of excess returns over their standard deviation) increases substantially
during crisis times. The average Sharpe ratio across maturities is 0.006 during non-crisis periods
and larger than 0.06 during crisis periods. Interestingly, the Sharpe ratio is higher for long-term
bonds than for short-term bonds during crises.
In sum, the results above are consistent with the model presented in Section 2, which shows that
crises can be due to shocks to the country’s repayment capacity or to shocks to investors’ wealth
(or other determinants of risk appetite). In both cases, the model predicts that the term premium
should increase. In the case of debtor side shocks, or demand shocks, the country demands more
long-term funds, driving up the cost of long-term borrowing. In the case of investor side shocks, or
supply shocks, bondholders become more sensitive to the price risk of long-term bonds and demand
a higher term premium. To complement the price evidence presented so far, the next section studies
bond issuance at diﬀerent maturities, during crisis and tranquil times. This will allow us to shed
light on the relative role of debtor and investor side shocks during crises. But before doing so, we
discuss three points related to the results presented in this section.
4.3 Interpreting the evidence
We end this section with a discussion of three issues that might help clarify the results related to
the risk premium and the term premium. First, can our results be due to a peso problem? Second,
what is the relation between our results and the literature on the term structure of interest rates
in developed countries? Third, does the fact that the risk premium is close to zero during tranquil
times imply that our explanation of why countries borrow short term is crisis contingent?
4.3.1 Peso problem
It is important to point out that it is very unlikely that our results on the risk premium and, even
more, on the term premium are the consequence of defaults being underrepresented in our sample,
a phenomenon also known as the peso problem.32 First of all, our sample does include a number
32To be precise, the name comes from the study of devaluations (of the Mexican peso) rather than defaults, but
the same argument applies.
23of default episodes and it is diﬃcult to claim that the period 1993-2003 was particularly good for
emerging markets. Second, as explained below, the behavior of short and long-term bonds during
defaults suggests that the results are not driven by a peso problem.
Consider ﬁrst the results on the term premium. Usually, long-term bonds trade at higher
discounts (i.e. lower percentage of face value) than short-term bonds, especially in periods of high
spreads (when defaults are likely to take place). In addition, post-default workouts generally involve
payments approximately proportional to face value. As a result, episodes of default should lead to
larger losses on short-term bonds than on long-term bonds.33 This suggests that if defaults were
underrepresented in our sample, the term premium would be even higher than the one we report,
especially during crisis times.
The argument above, that a peso problem is unlikely to drive the results on the term premium,
leads one to believe that a peso problem is not driving the positive risk premium either. The
argument goes as follows. It is very diﬃcult to think of an environment where long-term bonds have
higher returns than short-term bonds, while at the same time either long or short-term bonds have
a negative (or zero) risk premium. The reason is that the returns on short and long-term bonds
are highly correlated. A negative (zero) risk premium would imply a positive (zero) correlation
between bond returns and investors’ stochastic discount factor or marginal utility and, as a result,
a negative (zero) price of emerging market risk. But since the returns on long-term bonds are
much more volatile than those of short-term bonds, a negative (zero) price of risk would imply a
negative (zero) term premium, contradicting our ﬁndings. Therefore, it is not likely that the term
premium is positive, as we ﬁnd, without the risk premium being positive as well. In other words,
the existence of a positive term premium suggests that the price of emerging market risk is positive
and, therefore, the risk premium is also positive.34
33This in fact was the case during the Argentine default. We studied the excess returns of buying Argentine bonds
of diﬀerent maturities before the default (which was declared on December 23, 2001) and holding them until after the
default. For purchase dates between early November 2001 and one week before the default and selling dates between
one week and one year after the default, the losses on short-term bonds were virtually always greater than those on
long-term bonds, by around 10 percent.
34The idea that the observed term premia carry information on the underlying risk premium seems to be very
useful since estimates of the risk premium are typically very sensitive to the sample under study. For example,
Eichengreen and Portes (1988) ﬁnd that the ex-post excess returns on sovereign bonds issued by foreign countries in
the United States and Britain during the interwar years were close to zero. Klingen, Weder, and Zettelmeyer (2003)
ﬁnd that the ex-post excess returns on emerging market sovereign lending were negative during the 1970s and 1980s,
but positive during the 1990s. In this paper, although excess returns are positive in the full sample, we ﬁnd negative
excess returns for Argentina and Uruguay.
244.3.2 Related literature on the term structure of interest rates
There is a vast literature on the term structure of interest rates in developed countries related to our
ﬁndings on the risk premium and the term premium. Our results can be interpreted as deviations
from the “pure expectations hypothesis” and the “expectations hypothesis,” but stated in terms of
spreads instead of yields.
Assume ﬁrst that investors are risk neutral with respect to default episodes in emerging markets.
In this case, spreads should only reﬂect the expected losses from default (both the risk premium
and the term premium should be zero) and the pure expectation hypothesis in terms of spreads
should hold. A second, less restrictive, assumption would be that spreads reﬂect a risk premium
that may be diﬀe r e n ta c r o s sm a t u r i t i e sb u ti sc o n s t a n to v e rt i m e .I nt h i sc a s e ,c h a n g e si ns p r e a d s
should only reﬂect innovations to the expected default losses, namely, the expectation hypothesis
in terms of spreads should hold.35
In the literature on emerging market borrowing, the idea that spreads mostly reﬂect the market
assessment of the probability of default of a given country is still widely held. However, our ﬁndings
that the risk premium and the term premium are on average positive and that both increase during
crises suggest that neither the pure expectation hypothesis nor the expectation hypothesis hold for
emerging market spreads. The ﬁnance literature on the term structure in developed economies has
gradually rejected both versions of the expectation hypothesis and has moved toward attempts at
modelling and explaining patterns of time-varying risk premia.36 Our model provides a diﬀerent
simple equilibrium framework that is consistent with the observed patterns of the risk premium
and the term premium in emerging market bonds.37
4.3.3 When is it cheaper to borrow short term?
Our results show that it is cheaper to borrow short-term during both crisis and tranquil times. The
fact that it is cheaper to borrow short term during crises is clear from the high term premia during
35For some references on the topic and a deﬁnition of the pure expectation hypothesis and the expectation hypoth-
esis, see Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997), Bekaert and Hodrick (2001), and Dai
and Singleton (2002).
36See references in Cochrane (1999).
37Clearly, to provide a quantitative assessment of these facts more work remains to be done, both in the direction
of no-arbitrage models and in the direction of equilibrium models. For no-arbitrage models see Duﬃe and Singleton
(1999) and Duﬃe, Pedersen, and Singleton (2003).
25those episodes. In addition, it is also cheaper to borrow short-term during tranquil times because
there is a positive transition hazard rate from tranquil to crisis times. As a result, when a country
issues long-term bonds during tranquil times, it has to compensate bondholders for the drop in
bond prices that would take place if a crisis were to materialize. In other words, the spreads on
long-term bonds issued during tranquil times reﬂect not only the expected losses from default, but
also the expected risk premia that would need to be paid during the lifetime of the bond. This is
true irrespective of whether a crisis actually materializes. All that is needed is a positive transition
probability.
A caveat to this reasoning applies. This argument is valid only if emerging economies cannot
repurchase outstanding long-term bonds at the beginning of crises by issuing short-term bonds.
In other words, we are assuming that by issuing long-term bonds during tranquil times, countries
are forcing themselves to go through crises carrying these long-term obligations. The assumption
that there is some cost associated with repurchasing long-term bonds during crises is supported
by the fact that countries do not repurchase existing long-term bonds during those times, while
they very seldom issue new long-term bonds during periods of ﬁnancial turbulence (as shown in the
next section). It is diﬃcult to explain this knife-edge result of zero net new long-term issues in the
absence of some cost (signalling or otherwise) associated with retiring existing long-term bonds.38
5 Bond issuance
The model in Section 2 shows that the comovement between the term premium and the maturity
structure of debt can shed light on the type of shocks characterizing the cyclical behavior of emerging
market debt. On the one hand, demand side shocks such as an increase in current ﬁnancing needs or
a reduction in future expected government revenues are likely to lead to an increase in the maturity
structure of debt and a resulting increase in the term premium, generating a positive comovement.
On the other hand, supply side shocks, such as a decrease in investors’ wealth, are likely to lead
38The IMF (1999) reports that in fact there have been some attempts to buyback debt perceived to be “mispriced,”
i.e. paying a high risk premium. An example is the buyback of Polish Brady bonds in 1998, which amounted to
some 750 million dollars, after a buyback of around 1.7 billion dollars in 1997. Given that these operations, if known,
would drive bond prices up, they are usually carefully conducted and not oﬃcially conﬁrmed until after they have
been completed. If successful, a quiet buyback at the discounted price delivers a net reduction in the debt burden.
Though these operations exist, the diﬃculty in completing them successfully makes them rare and small relative to
the outstanding debt. Moreover, these operations take place in favorable times.
26to an increase in the term premium and a resulting decrease in the maturity structure of debt,
generating a negative comovement.
In this section, we study whether the behavior of the quantity data are consistent with demand
or supply type of shocks. We concentrate on two sets of variables, the amount issued at diﬀerent
maturities and the average bond maturity. We study the time-varying patterns of these variables.
In particular, we analyze how their behavior is aﬀected by crises, by diﬀerent measures of spreads,
and by the term premium.
To study the amount issued at diﬀerent maturities, we run a separate regression of issuance
at each maturity as a function of each conditioning variable. We use a Tobit model, estimated by
maximum likelihood, pooling all observations. These estimations take into account the fact that
observations are left censored at zero. The dependent variable is the amount issued at each maturity
in any given week, normalized by the average weekly issues for each country. This normalization
takes into consideration that the average amount issued varies across countries. We use four diﬀerent
bond maturities: up to 3-year maturity (short term), more than 3-year maturity and up to 6-year
maturity (medium-short term), more than 6-year maturity and up to 9-year maturity (medium-long
term), and more than 9-year maturity (long term). As explanatory variables we use, alternatively,
the crisis dummy deﬁned above, the 3-year spread, the 9-year spread, the emerging market bond
index (EMBI) spread for each country, and the predicted term premium for each country. For
spreads, we use log-spreads, deﬁned as log(1+st,τ). The EMBI spreads, calculated by J.P. Morgan,
are well-known measures of long-term spreads in emerging markets. They not only provide an
alternative estimate of long-term spreads, but also extend the sample for Mexico to cover the
Mexican crisis (though they exclude Uruguay). We use the predicted term premium because it
most directly captures the cost of issuing long-term debt relative to short-term debt. This variable
is computed by regressing ex-post excess returns on 3-year and 9-year spreads and then obtaining
the predicted value. As before, we compute robust standard errors using the country and crisis
indicators as clusters.
The Tobit estimations are reported in Table 7. The estimations show that short-term issues are
hardly aﬀected by any of the conditioning variables; only the 3-year spread is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 10 percent level. However, medium- and long-term issues do show clear cyclical patterns.
The conditioning variables become more statistically signiﬁcant and the point estimates negative
27and large in magnitude. In the regressions for long-term issues, all the regressors are signiﬁcant,
at least at the 5 percent level. The coeﬃcients reported, which are the marginal eﬀects or the
eﬀects on the observed (not the latent) variable, also seem large. For example, an increase of 100
basis points in 9-year spreads leads to a decline in the weekly issues of 0.223, where the average
value of the normalized weekly issue is 1. In sum, the estimations in Table 7 suggest that during
crises and, more generally, in periods of high spreads, countries tend to issue less debt. In addition,
the longer the maturity of debt, the larger the eﬀect of crises and spreads on the amount issued.
Interestingly, the estimated term premium has a big negative eﬀect on long-term issues, but no
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on shorter-term issues. The result that short-term issues are barely
aﬀected by the diﬀerent variables reﬂects the fact that although countries tend to issue less when
spreads are high, they mostly issue short-term bonds (if they issue at all). These two eﬀects cancel
o u t ,l e a d i n gt on o n - s i g n i ﬁcant coeﬃcients.39
To study the average maturity of issues, we estimate a model that takes into account the
incidental truncation of the data, since the average maturity is only available when countries issue
bonds and, otherwise, there are missing observations. As noted initially by Heckman (1979),
ignoring the missing values might lead to a sample selection bias. In our case, one would tend
to miss observations when spreads are high and countries do not issue any bonds. To account
for this selection, we estimate two equations simultaneously by maximum likelihood. One equation
describes the probability of observing the average maturity of issues each week. The second equation
estimates how the average maturity is correlated with the conditioning variables. In this type of
estimations, it is usually diﬃcult to select the variables that enter in each equation. We choose
diﬀerent speciﬁcations to see whether the results are robust to this choice.40 The regressors included
in the selection equation are similar to those used for the Tobit models. These variables help to
predict whether countries issue at all. The regressors included are, alternatively, the crisis dummy,
the short and long-term spreads, and the country EMBI spread. For the main equation, we use
the long-term spread and, alternatively, the estimated term premium, which captures the relative
39Note that the negative sign of the coeﬃcients is not likely the result of reverse causality. If bond issuance had an
impact on spreads, an increase in the demand for funds would push down prices and increase spreads, resulting in a
positive coeﬃcient. To the extent that reverse causality played a role, it would bias the results against our ﬁndings.
40As another robustness check, we also estimated the main equation without taking into account the selection bias
a n do b t a i n e ds i m i l a rr e s u l t s .
28cost of issuing long term. As the variables are not scaled, we include country dummies. Again, we
compute robust standard errors using the country and crisis indicators as clusters.
The results of the selection equations, displayed in Table 8, show that countries are less likely to
issue bonds during crisis times and, more generally, when spreads are high. In addition, the results
of the main equations show that the average maturity of issues shortens when long-term spreads
or the predicted term premium increases. These results are consistent with the pattern displayed
in Figure 5, which shows the average maturity and spreads over time for each country. The ﬁgure
also shows that issuance is negatively correlated with crises and, more generally, with the level
of spreads. Finally, another way to summarize the evidence is that countries try to extend the
maturity structure of their debt whenever market conditions permit it, i.e. when markets require a
low term premium.
T h er e s u l t sp r e s e n t e di nt h i ss e c t i o n ,w h e nc o m b i n e dw i t ht h er e s u l t si nS e c t i o n4 ,p r o v i d e
compelling evidence that supply side factors play an important role during emerging market crises.
The results show that crises and, more generally, periods of high spreads, are associated with higher
risk and term premia and lower amount and shorter maturity of issues. If crises were mostly the
result of debtor side factors (demand shocks), they would be associated with more issues at longer
maturities and a higher term premium. The fact that the term premium increases while debtors are
curtailing long-term borrowing suggests that investor side factors (supply shocks) play an important
role during crises.
6 Final remarks
This paper proposes a new explanation to why emerging economies borrow short term, even though
this type of debt increases their exposure to liquidity crises. We argue that countries choose to be
exposed to crises because investors require a high term premium for holding long-term debt, making
short-term borrowing cheaper. The model in the paper shows this trade-oﬀ and endogenously
derives the maturity structure and the term premium (the relative cost of borrowing long term). The
model illustrates the risk-sharing problem between the debtor country and investors. The empirical
section of the paper shows that the term premium is, on average, positive and increases signiﬁcantly
during crises. Therefore, our ﬁndings explain not only why countries tend to borrow short term, but
29also why they rely so heavily on short-term debt during periods of ﬁnancial turbulence. Finally,
the negative correlation between the term premium and the debt maturity strongly suggests an
important role of investor side factors in shaping the way that emerging economies borrow.
The distinction between investor and debtor side factors has important implications not only
for academic discussions, but also for policy recommendations. One important example is the
discussion on how to deal with ﬁnancial crises. Some papers argue that countries borrow short term
as a way to commit to the right policies when moral hazard is a problem. From this perspective,
the cost of crises is what makes these episodes a strong disciplining device. Eﬀorts to limit the
cost of crises through loans from the international ﬁnancial community, or other liquidity-providing
mechanisms, would exacerbate the moral hazard problem, and could end up reducing welfare.41
If, on the other hand, countries borrow short term because long-term debt is too expensive, those
same crisis prevention mechanisms would improve welfare. The beneﬁts would come not only from
fewer and less severe crises, but also from cheaper long-term borrowing as a result of the reduction
in the price risk of long-term debt.
The results in this paper lead to several possible directions for future research. First, it would be
interesting to extend the coverage of our analysis to contrast the results presented here with results
derived from bonds issued by other emerging economies, developed economies, domestic currency
debt, and private borrowers. However, data restrictions to construct time series of spread curves
will probably limit any future analysis to certain borrowers (likely other developed economies and
primarily sovereign debtors). This type of analysis might shed light on whether investors treat the
debt from developed countries diﬀerently than that from emerging economies. As another exten-
sion, the empirical analysis could be carried out in a dynamic framework to study the stochastic
properties of spreads at diﬀerent maturities. Preliminary evidence suggests that long-term spreads
“overreact” to movements in short-term spreads. More precisely, long-term spreads seem to react
to innovations in short-term spreads as if these innovations were more persistent than what they
actually are, leading to excess volatility. It is interesting to note that this type of evidence seems
at odds with what other authors have found when studying the dynamic behavior of yield curves
in developed countries.42 Finally, the fact that the Sharpe ratio of long-term bonds is higher than
41See Jeanne (2000) for a discussion of this argument.
42See Campbell and Shiller (1991).
30that of short-term bonds suggests that the risk of long-term bonds is less diversiﬁable than the
risk of short-term bonds. A possible explanation may lie on a higher sensitivity of long-term bonds
to global factors (such as investors’ risk appetite) and a higher sensitivity of short-term bonds to
domestic factors (such as default probabilities). This hypothesis could be tested by estimating
cross-country correlations at diﬀerent maturities. A higher correlation at long maturities would
not only explain the higher Sharpe ratios on long-term bonds, but also suggest a role for ﬁnancial
linkages as a source of contagion or, more generally, cross-country comovement.
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34Appendix A: Model details
This appendix provides some details on the model.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .
The investors’ ﬁrst order condition is
E[u (w +( π − pL)DL)(π − pL)] = 0.
When DL =0 , u (w+(π−pL)DL) is a positive constant, and it easily follows that pL = E[π]=π0.
Next, we consider the case DL > 0.
Let F(·) be the CDF of π.W ec a nr e w r i t et h eﬁrst order condition as
  pL
0
u (w +( π − pL)DL)(π − pL)dF(π)+
  1
pL
u (w +( π − pL)DL)(π − pL)dF(π)=0 .
In the ﬁrst region, π − pL < 0 and u (w +( π − pL)DL) >u  (w). In the second region, π − pL > 0







u (w)(π − pL)dF(π)+
  1
pL
u (w)(π − pL)dF(π) > 0,
which implies pL <E [π]=π0.
We now show that p (DL) < 0.D i ﬀerentiating investors’ ﬁrst order condition with respect to
















u  (w +( π − pL)DL)(π − pL)2 
Since u (·) > 0 and u  (·) < 0, it easily follows that
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u  (w +( π − pL)DL)(π − pL)2 
< 0.
As a result, to show that p (DL) < 0 it suﬃces to show that
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u (w +( π − pL)DL)(π − pL)dF(π).
Since u(·) displays decreasing absolute risk aversion, in the ﬁrst region π − pL < 0 and
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while in the second region π − pL > 0 and
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u (w +( π − pL)DL)(π − pL)
 
=0 ,
where the last equality follows from the ﬁrst order condition.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
Let F(·) be the CDF of π,a n dl e t
x(π,D L)=m a x{D0 − πY +( π − pL)DL,0}
36be the ﬁscal adjustment in period 1. The government’s objective function can be written as
W(DL)=π0Y − D0 − (π0 − pL)DL +
 
x(π,DL)≥0
[x(π,D L) − C(x(π,D L))]dF(π).














When DL =0 ,t h eﬁrst term in W (DL) is zero and we have
W (0) =
  ˆ π
π
 
1 − C (x(π,0))
 
(π − π0)dF(π),
w h e r ew eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tp(0) = π0,a n dˆ π = D0
Y is the minimum π such that x(π,0) = 0.T h e
fact that C (x) > 1 for x>0 implies that the ﬁrst factor in the integrand is negative. The fact
that π0Y − D0 > 0 and πY − D0 < 0 implies that ˆ π ∈ (π,π0) and, thus, the second factor in the
integrand is also negative. This shows that
W (0) > 0.
When DL = ˆ DL, the second term in W (DL) is zero and we have
W ( ˆ DL)=−(π0 − pL)+p ( ˆ DL) ˆ DL.
T h ef a c tt h a ti n v e s t o r sa r er i s ka v e r s ei m p l i e st h a tpL < π0 and p ( ˆ DL) < 0.T h i ss h o w st h a t
W ( ˆ DL) < 0.
Since W (0) > 0 and W ( ˆ DL) < 0,t h eo p t i m u mDL must be in (0, ˆ DL).
37Appendix B: Estimating spread curves
To estimate spread curves, we follow a modiﬁed version of the procedure developed by Nelson and
Siegel (1987) to estimate yields. At date t we have a sample of J coupon bonds, with various
coupon and maturity characteristics. Let ˆ Pt,j be the estimated price at time t of the emerging
market bond j with coupons {cj,t+k}
τ
k=1 and maturity τj.P r i c eˆ Pt,j c a nb ew r i t t e na s
ˆ Pt,j (¯ at)=
τj  
k=1
e−kyt,k(¯ at)cj,t+k + e
−τjyt,τj(¯ at), (1)
where yt,k(¯ at) is the yield on a zero-coupon bond of maturity k; ¯ at ≡ (at,0,...,at,3) is a vector of
time-varying parameters.





t,k is the zero-coupon yield on a default-free German or U.S. bond (depending on the
currency denomination of the original bond) and st,k is the zero-coupon spread. We express the
spread st,k as












We proceed with the estimation in two steps. First, we compute the yields on default-free
German and U.S. bonds, y∗
t,k. To do that, we use German and U.S. bond prices and estimate the
parameters ¯ a∗
t using an expression analogous to (2). In the second step, we use the yields y∗
t,k
derived in the ﬁrst step and expression (2) to estimate the parameters ¯ at. I nb o t hs t e p s ,w eu s e
non-linear least squares (NLLS) period by period. For example, in the second step, we take the J




Pt,j − ˆ Pt,j (¯ at)
 2
,
where Pt,j is the price of bond j at time t.
38The approximation is parsimonious and gives a good ﬁt of the data. This type of approximation
h a so t h e ra d v a n t a g e s .I ta l l o w su st oi n c l u d eb o n d sd e n o m i n a t e di nd i ﬀerent currencies, using most
of the available information to obtain a better ﬁt of the curve.43 Finally, expression (2) has a
simple interpretation. Spreads can be viewed as having three components. The constant is a long-
term, level component. The second term is a short-term component as it starts at one and decays
monotonically and quickly to zero. The third term can be interpreted as a “hump” or medium-term
component, which starts at zero, increases, and then goes to zero. Small values of at,3 generate a
slow decay and can better ﬁt the curve at long maturities. We adopt this speciﬁc parametrization
of the yield curve and ﬁx at,3 =0 .005 following Diebold and Li (2002); this helps in the convergence
of the NLLS estimation described above.44
Once we have computed yields and spreads, we calculate prices and excess returns. The price
of any coupon bond can simply be obtained using (1). But to compute excess returns, one needs
to compare the returns of an emerging market bond to those of a comparable risk-less bond.
Using bonds with the same maturity and coupon structure can be misleading because the yields on
emerging market bonds tend to be much higher than those on risk-less bonds, aﬀecting signiﬁcantly
the payments proﬁle and duration. In particular, the high yield on an emerging market bond means
that its short-run payments carry more weight in the bond valuation. Therefore, its duration will
b em u c hs h o r t e rt h a nt h a to fas i m i l a rU . S .b o n d .
In this paper, we deal with this problem using two diﬀerent approaches. The two approaches
lead to similar expressions for excess returns and to very similar results. The ﬁrst approach consists
in calculating separately the returns on an emerging market bond and on a comparable German or
U.S. bond. Then, one subtracts the returns on the risk-less bonds from those on the risky bonds.
The diﬃculty lies in constructing the comparable risk-less bond. We proceed in the following way.
We take a given coupon bond for the emerging economy, and construct a portfolio of risk-less bonds
with the same time proﬁle of payments. For a given emerging market bond with coupons {ct+k} and
maturity τ,w ed e r i v et h ew e i g h t sωt,k = e
−kyt,k
Pt ct+k for k =1 ,...,n−1,a n dωt,n = e−τyt,τ
Pt (ct+τ +1 ) .
43For the countries and periods in which a comparison is feasible, we found similar results when estimating spreads
by calculating ﬁrst the yield curve for each country (using only bonds in one currency) and then subtracting the
corresponding yield curve for Germany or the U.S. In addition, we compared our results with EMBI spreads on
long-term bonds, which are compiled by J.P. Morgan, obtaining similar values.
44We chose this value of at,3 after experimenting with diﬀerent alternatives, which generated similar results.
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In this way the emerging market bond and the U.S. portfolio have an identical time proﬁle of
payments and an identical duration, equal to
 n
k=1 kωt,k.


















Notce that the expression in brackets represents the excess returns on a zero-coupon bond. There-
fore, the expression for excess returns is a weighted average of excess returns on zero-coupon bonds.





e−kst,k(¯ at)ct+k + e−τst,τ(¯ at),
and obtain the excess returns






The spread-based excess returns   ert,τ can also be interpreted as a weighted average of returns on
zero-coupon bonds, but the weights ωt,k are slightly diﬀerent from those in (3). Both approaches
are valid, in the sense that both approaches give us excess returns that can be obtained with the
appropriate portfolio of emerging market and risk-free bonds. Their interpretation are slightly
diﬀerent: while the ﬁrst approach is easier to interpret in terms of the ﬁnancial strategy involved,
t h es e c o n do n ei se a s i e rt oi n t e r p r e ti nt e r m so ft h eb e h a v i o ro fs p r e a d s .
Using prices derived from spreads to calculate excess returns has an important practical advan-
45This expression holds for a bond that pays no coupon in period t +1 . If the bond pays a coupon in period t +1
the expression is easily adjusted.
40tage. Since we work with bonds denominated in diﬀerent currencies, we avoid the need to report
every result for both dollar and deutsche mark/euro bonds. The reason is that while Pt,τ depends
on the currency of choice, Ps
t,τ can be computed only from spreads. All the results reported in
the paper are based on spread-based prices. We have also computed excess returns using the ﬁrst
method and obtained very similar results.46
46If we restricted ourselves to zero-coupon bonds, the excess returns obtained using the two approaches would be
identical. However, almost all the emerging market bonds used in the estimation of the yield curve are coupon bonds,
so we prefer to derive returns for coupon bonds.
41Figure 1   
Comparative Statics   
zero term premium (pL = π0) zero term premium (pL = π0)
maturity structure irrelevant
(any DL, DS)
short-term debt (DL = 0)
zero term premium (pL = π0) positive term premium (pL < π0)
long-term debt (DS = 0) maturity structure intermediate




















Short- and Long-Term Spreads



















































































































3-year maturity (in percent)




















































































































Short- and Long-Term Prices
The figures show indices of prices of 3-year and 12-year maturities over time by country. Prices are estimated assuming a coupon rate of

































































































































































































































































Sharpe Ratio During Crisis and Non-Crisis Periods
The figure shows the Sharpe ratio corresponding to maturities of 3, 6, 9, and 12 years during crisis periods, non-
crisis periods, and all periods. Excess returns are estimated using a holding period of one week and assuming a

































































Average Maturity and Spreads
The figures show the average maturity of bonds issued in each semester and the estimated spread of maturity of 9 years by country. In the























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Average maturity (left scale)
9-year spread (right scale)
46Country Sample Period
Argentina Apr 1994 - May 2003 63 1.0 23.6 8.3
Brazil Nov 1994 - May 2003 38 1.5 29.5 13.4
Colombia Apr 1996 - May 2003 21 1.3 25.7 9.7
Mexico Oct 1995 - May 2003 26 1.5 27.5 12.7
Russia Nov 1996 - May 2003 21 2.2 24.2 10.7
Turkey Apr 1996 - May 2003 49 0.8 17.9 5.3
Uruguay Nov 1998 - May 2003 10 1.8 26.4 9.2
Venezuela Apr 1993 - May 2003 22 1.4 26.2 15.7
Germany Apr 1993 - May 2003 229 0.6 20.0 5.9
U.S. Apr 1993 - May 2003 51 1.5 29.4 23.2
Country Sample Period
Argentina Jul 1993 - Dec 2002 146      17,731       59,388      29,898      60,008 
Brazil Jul 1994 - Dec 2002 45        7,557       29,273        9,246      57,959 
Colombia Jan 1993 - Dec 2002 41        1,087         9,080        3,797      13,567 
Mexico Jan 1991 - Dec 2002 54        5,941       14,798        7,887      39,836 
Russia Jan 1993 - Dec 2002 27        3,513       10,010      12,839      49,757 
Turkey Jan 1990 - Dec 2002 77        4,944       22,436        8,294      17,415 
Uruguay Jan 1993 - Dec 2002 18           195         1,811           970        3,899 








From 3 to 6 
Years 
From 6 to 9 
Years 
The tables describe the price and quantity data used in the paper. The top table shows the sample periods, number of bonds, and
maturities covered by the price data. Maturities are expressed in years. Minimum, maximum, and 75th percentile correspond to
the average minimum, maximum, and 75th percentile maturity over time within the sample period. The bottom table shows the
sample periods, number of bonds, and average amount issued by maturity covered by the quantity data. Maturity up to 3 years
includes bonds of 3-year maturity, maturity from 3 to 6 years includes bonds of 6-year maturity, and maturity from 6 to 9 years






Average Amount Issued by Maturity (USD Thousands)
Number of 
Bonds
47er3 er6 er9 er12 er3 er6 er9 er12 er3 er6 er9 er12
Average 2.90 3.49 6.74 8.26 3.08 3.45 5.93 6.95 3.23 3.44 5.46 6.27
Argentina -7.08 -4.21 0.55 0.48 -6.34 -4.02 -0.31 -0.98 -5.71 -3.85 -0.81 -1.63
Brazil 6.02 6.34 9.28 12.69 6.04 6.21 8.60 11.34 6.06 6.12 8.16 10.52
Colombia 4.67 4.41 4.11 4.50 4.61 4.34 4.03 4.28 4.57 4.30 3.99 4.15
Mexico 3.56 5.25 6.72 7.89 3.52 5.08 6.40 7.43 3.49 4.95 6.17 7.11
Russia 14.84 18.73 39.72 45.96 15.09 18.03 33.43 37.57 15.31 17.54 30.01 33.53
Turkey 4.09 3.78 4.52 6.92 4.09 3.77 4.32 6.11 4.09 3.77 4.21 5.63
Uruguay -2.72 -5.21 -5.33 -5.74 -2.51 -4.93 -5.22 -5.69 -2.32 -4.70 -5.11 -5.61
Venezuela 2.50 1.05 1.10 1.74 2.63 1.21 1.18 1.59 2.74 1.35 1.25 1.53
The table shows the annualized means of excess returns over comparable German and U.S. bonds, by country and across countries.
Excess returns are estimated using a holding period of one week and for coupon rates of 5, 7.5, and 10 percent. er3, er6, er9, and er12
stand for 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-year excess returns.
Table 2
Excess Returns
Coupon = 5% Coupon = 7.5% Coupon = 10%
Annualized Means Over Comparable German and U.S. Bonds, In Percent
48Start date End date
Argentina
Crisis 1 12/30/94 01/12/96
Crisis 2 09/04/98 11/06/98
Crisis 3 07/13/01 -
Brazil
Crisis 1 01/20/95 10/06/95
Crisis 2 08/21/98 04/23/99
Crisis 3 06/14/02 04/06/03
Colombia
Crisis 1 08/28/98 02/26/99
Crisis 2 05/05/00 06/23/00
Crisis 3 07/26/02 11/15/02
Mexico
Crisis 1 08/28/98 11/06/98
Russia
Crisis 1 07/10/98 06/29/01
Turkey
Crisis 1 08/28/98 11/13/98
Uruguay
Crisis 1 04/19/02 -
Venezuela
Crisis 1 08/14/98 03/03/00
We use four different crisis definitions. Crisis definition 1 sets the beginning of a crisis when 9-year spreads are greater
than a threshold, which is defined as the average spread over the previous six months plus 300 basis points. The end of
the crisis is at the end of the first four-week period in which spreads have remained below the threshold used to
determine the beginning of the crisis. Crisis definition 2 is similar to crisis definition 1, but uses 400 basis points to
define the threshold. Crisis definitions 3 and 4 are similar, but use a period of one week instead of a period of four




49er3 er6 er9 er12
All Periods 3.08 3.45 5.93 6.95
Crisis Periods 11.43 15.03 30.88 39.06
Non-Crisis Periods 1.02 0.65 0.26 -0.11
Crisis Periods 11.47 16.85 42.50 55.70
Non-Crisis Periods 1.85 1.54 1.20 0.94
Crisis Periods 10.31 13.39 33.38 42.67
Non-Crisis Periods 1.86 1.80 1.73 1.66
Crisis Periods 11.67 20.32 52.03 66.03
Non-Crisis Periods 2.05 1.52 1.24 1.20
The table shows the annualized means of excess returns over comparable German and U.S. bonds during crisis
and non-crisis periods across countries. Results are presented for the four crisis definitions. Excess returns are
estimated using a holding period of one week and assuming a coupon rate of 7.5 percent. er3, er6, er9, and
er12 stand for 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-year excess returns.
Crisis Definition 3
Threshold + 300 basis points, ending crisis after one week of low spreads
Crisis Definition 4
Threshold + 400 basis points, ending crisis after one week of low spreads
Threshold + 300 basis points, ending crisis after four weeks of low spreads
Crisis Definition 2
Threshold + 400 basis points, ending crisis after four weeks of low spreads
Table 4
Annualized Means Over Comparable German and U.S. Bonds, In Percent
Crisis Definition 1
Excess Returns During Crisis and Non-Crisis Periods 
50er3 er6 er9 er12
Average
Crisis Periods 11.43 15.03 30.88 39.06
Non-Crisis Periods 1.02 0.65 0.26 -0.11
Argentina
Crisis Periods -10.03 -3.47 11.81 15.87
Non-Crisis Periods -4.36 -4.30 -6.10 -8.78
Brazil
Crisis Periods 18.36 25.98 41.73 58.11
Non-Crisis Periods 1.95 -0.10 -1.30 -1.85
Colombia
Crisis Periods 22.96 33.98 39.79 42.73
Non-Crisis Periods 1.85 0.10 -0.95 -1.02
Mexico
Crisis Periods 81.03 82.56 90.33 113.92
Non-Crisis Periods 1.88 3.43 4.64 5.32
Russia
Crisis Periods 35.06 31.06 62.37 70.75
Non-Crisis Periods 0.38 7.93 12.80 14.35
Turkey
Crisis Periods 21.66 61.44 109.15 162.47
Non-Crisis Periods 3.55 2.24 1.90 2.91
Uruguay
Crisis Periods -6.03 -9.76 -6.61 -4.78
Non-Crisis Periods -1.35 -3.34 -4.78 -5.98
Venezuela
Crisis Periods 5.61 6.89 13.61 23.21
Non-Crisis Periods 2.09 0.20 -0.95 -1.95
The table shows the annualized means of excess returns over comparable German and U.S. bonds during crisis
and non-crisis periods by country. Crisis and non-crisis periods are determined according to definition 1.
Excess returns are estimated using a holding period of one week and assuming a coupon rate of 7.5 percent.
er3, er6, er9, and er12 stand for 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-year excess returns.
Table 5
Excess Returns During Crisis and Non-Crisis Periods by Country
Crisis Definition 1



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9-Year Spread -0.476 ** -0.590 *** -0.332 ** -0.399 **
[2.287] [4.730] [2.116] [2.000]
Selection Equation
Crisis Dummy -0.149 **
[2.033]
3-Year Spread -0.032 ***
[2.985]




Country Dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,996 2,996 2,996 2,338
Main Equation
Predicted Term Premium -2.724 ** -2.696 *** -5.554 *** -2.103 ***
(er9-er3) [2.316] [3.238] [4.904] [3.029]
Selection Equation
Crisis Dummy -0.191 **
[2.212]
3-Year Spread -0.031 ***
[3.005]




Country Dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,996 2,996 2,996 2,338
Table 8
Average Maturity
The tables report selection bias regressions of the average maturity of issues on long-term spreads
and the predicted term premium. In the selection equation, the decision to issue is explained by a
crisis dummy, short- and long-term spreads, and the EMBI. Regressions are estimated by
maximum likelihood. The independent variables are in logs. The crisis dummy corresponds to
crisis definition 1. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Observations are assumed to be independent across clusters but not within clusters. Clusters are
defined by country and crisis periods. All regressions include country dummies. Regressions using
the EMBI do not include Uruguay due to data availability. Robust z statistics are in brackets. *,
**, and ***: significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Average Maturity of Issues
Dependent Variable: Average Maturity of Issues
54Issue Maturity Coupon Data
Bond Date Date Market Frequency Available
1 10/15/92 10/15/97 250,000 USD Eurobond 8.25 A Price / Quantity
2 08/02/93 08/02/96 150,000 USD Eurobond 6.875 S Price / Quantity
3 08/02/93 08/02/00 100,000 USD Eurobond 8.25 S Price / Quantity
4 10/05/93 10/05/98 608,580 DM Eurobond 8 A Price / Quantity
5 11/05/93 03/29/05 8,466,548 USD Brady Bond Floating S Price
6 12/20/93 12/20/03 2,050,000 USD Global 8.375 S Price / Quantity
7 03/04/94 03/06/95 350,000 USD Eurobond Floating N.A. Quantity
8 04/01/94 04/01/04 100,000 USD Eurobond 7.9 A Quantity
9 07/11/94 07/11/97 312,538 DM Eurobond 8 A Quantity
10 08/22/94 08/27/97 100,000 USD Eurobond Floating Q Price / Quantity
11 08/26/94 08/26/97 67,688 ATS Eurobond 8 A Quantity
12 10/14/94 10/14/97 73,562 CAD Eurobond 10.5 A Quantity
13 10/21/94 10/21/97 288,453 ITL Eurobond 13.45 A Quantity
14 11/01/94 11/01/99 500,000 USD Global 10.95 S Price / Quantity
15 11/01/94 11/01/01 52,000 USD Domestic Floating A Quantity
16 12/09/94 12/09/97 75,720 ESP Eurobond 12.8 A Quantity
17 12/15/94 12/15/99 149,815 JPY Eurobond 7.1 A Quantity
18 12/19/94 12/19/97 199,753 JPY Eurobond 6 A Quantity
19 12/28/94 12/28/10 23,674 USD Domestic Floating M Quantity
20 01/06/95 01/06/98 187,463 FRF Eurobond 9.875 A Quantity
21 08/29/95 08/29/00 795,153 DM Eurobond 9.25 A Price / Quantity
22 11/09/95 11/09/98 130,905 CHF Eurobond 7.125 A Quantity
23 11/14/95 11/14/02 704,460 EUR Eurobond 10.5 A Quantity
24 11/23/95 11/14/02 177,493 DM Eurobond 10.5 A Quantity
25 11/29/95 03/25/99 441,534 JPY Eurobond 5 A Quantity
26 12/06/95 12/28/98 49,297 ATS Eurobond 8.5 A Quantity
27 12/27/95 06/27/97 137,504 JPY Eurobond 3.25 S Quantity
28 02/06/96 02/06/03 676,200 EUR Eurobond 10.25 A Quantity
29 02/20/96 02/23/01 1,100,000 USD Global 9.25 S Price / Quantity
30 03/06/96 03/06/01 321,473 ITL Eurobond 13.25 A Quantity
31 04/04/96 04/04/06 74,993 JPY Eurobond 7.4 A Quantity
32 04/10/96 04/10/06 676,652 DM Eurobond 11.25 A Price / Quantity
33 04/15/96 09/01/02 99,341 EUR Eurobond 12.625 A Quantity
34 04/18/96 04/18/01 95,200 ATS Eurobond 9 A Quantity
35 04/25/96 04/25/06 74,444 JPY Eurobond 7.4 A Quantity
36 05/07/96 03/27/01 845,499 JPY Eurobond 5.5 A Quantity
37 05/15/96 05/15/06 65,761 JPY Eurobond 7.4 A Quantity
38 05/20/96 05/20/99 326,146 DM Eurobond 7 A Price / Quantity
39 05/20/96 05/20/11 645,360 EUR Eurobond 11.75 A Quantity
40 06/25/96 06/25/99 227,505 ITL Eurobond 11 A Quantity
41 07/05/96 07/05/99 147,589 NLG Eurobond 7.625 A Quantity
42 08/14/96 08/14/01 155,302 GBP Eurobond 11.5 A Quantity
43 08/15/96 08/19/99 500,000 USD Eurobond Floating Q Price / Quantity
44 09/19/96 09/19/03 248,363 DM Eurobond 9 A Price / Quantity
45 09/19/96 09/19/16 248,363 DM Eurobond 12 A Quantity
46 10/09/96 10/09/06 1,300,000 USD Global 11 S Price / Quantity
47 11/05/96 11/05/03 329,903 ITL Eurobond 11 A Quantity
48 11/12/96 03/24/05 445,407 JPY Eurobond 6 A Quantity
49 11/13/96 11/13/26 329,078 DM Eurobond 11.75 A Quantity
50 12/04/96 12/04/03 230,357 CHF Eurobond 7 A Quantity
Appendix Table 1
Description of Emerging Market Bonds Included in the Sample
Coupon
Amount Issued
 (USD Thousands) Currency
Argentina
55Issue Maturity Coupon Data
Bond Date Date Market Frequency Available Coupon
Amount Issued
 (USD Thousands) Currency
51 12/05/96 12/20/02 444,286 JPY Eurobond 5 S Quantity
52 12/13/96 12/13/98 500,000 USD Domestic 8 S Quantity
53 12/20/96 12/20/02 439,504 JPY Eurobond 5 N.A. Quantity
54 12/23/96 02/23/05 643,561 DM Eurobond 8.5 A Price / Quantity
55 01/03/97 01/03/07 385,990 ITL Eurobond 10 A Quantity
56 01/30/97 01/30/17 3,287,500 USD Global 11.375 S Price / Quantity
57 03/18/97 03/18/04 898,382 DM Eurobond 7 A Price / Quantity
58 04/09/97 03/18/04 83,852 ATS Eurobond 7 A Quantity
59 05/08/97 05/27/04 449,785 JPY Eurobond 4.4 S Quantity
60 05/09/97 05/09/02 2,292,000 USD Domestic 8.75 S Quantity
61 05/23/97 05/23/02 138,569 ESP Eurobond 7.5 A Quantity
62 05/27/97 05/27/04 295,869 ITL Eurobond Floating Q Quantity
63 05/27/97 05/27/04 420,198 JPY Eurobond 4.4 S Quantity
64 06/25/97 06/25/07 330,785 GBP Eurobond 10 A Quantity
65 08/11/97 08/11/07 416,948 ITL Eurobond 7.625 A Quantity
66 09/19/97 09/19/27 2,500,000 USD Global 9.75 S Quantity
67 10/17/97 10/16/98 500,000 USD Domestic 0 Z Price
68 10/21/97 03/18/04 435,325 ITL Eurobond 7 A Quantity
69 10/24/97 03/18/04 217,845 ITL Eurobond 7 A Quantity
70 10/30/97 10/30/09 570,169 DM Eurobond 8 A Price / Quantity
71 12/16/97 11/30/02 500,000 USD Yankee 9.5 S Quantity
72 12/22/97 12/22/00 158,580 ITL Eurobond 8 A Quantity
73 01/14/98 01/20/01 1,563,000 USD Domestic Floating N.A. Quantity
74 02/04/98 02/04/03 663,790 EUR Eurobond 8.75 A Quantity
75 02/26/98 02/26/08 822,684 EUR Eurobond Step Down A Price / Quantity
76 03/12/98 10/30/09 416,914 ITL Eurobond 8 A Quantity
77 04/03/98 02/26/08 244,577 EUR Eurobond 8 A Price / Quantity
78 04/03/98 02/26/08 249,335 EUR Eurobond 8 A Quantity
79 04/13/98 04/10/05 1,000,000 USD Global Floating S Quantity
80 04/21/98 04/21/08 820,829 EUR Global 8.125 A Price / Quantity
81 07/06/98 07/06/10 556,615 EUR Eurobond 8.25 A Price / Quantity
82 07/08/98 07/08/05 565,384 ITL Eurobond Floating Q Quantity
83 07/21/98 07/21/03 1,000,000 USD Domestic Floating Q Quantity
84 07/29/98 07/29/05 414,863 DM Eurobond 7.875 A Price / Quantity
85 07/30/98 07/30/10 554,485 EUR Eurobond 8.5 A Price / Quantity
86 10/16/98 09/19/27 293,450 USD Domestic 9.9375 S Quantity
87 11/19/98 11/19/08 299,618 DM Eurobond 9 A Price / Quantity
88 11/19/98 12/04/05 1,000,000 USD Global 11 S Quantity
89 12/04/98 12/04/05 1,000,000 USD Global 11 S Price / Quantity
90 01/15/99 04/15/07 48,918 USD Domestic Floating Q Quantity
91 02/04/99 02/04/03 214,198 EUR Eurobond 8.75 A Quantity
92 02/25/99 02/25/02 112,061 EUR Domestic 8 A Quantity
93 02/25/99 02/25/19 1,000,000 USD Global 12.125 S Price / Quantity
94 02/25/99 02/25/19 1,000,000 USD Global 12.125 S Quantity
95 02/26/99 02/26/08 393,623 EUR Eurobond Step Down A Price / Quantity
96 03/01/99 03/01/29 125,000 USD Yankee 8.875 S Quantity
97 03/04/99 03/04/04 433,182 EUR Eurobond 9.5 A Price / Quantity
98 03/15/99 04/06/04 300,000 USD Private Placement Floating Q Quantity
99 03/19/99 03/17/00 1,168,544 USD Domestic 0 Z Price
100 04/06/99 04/10/04 300,000 USD Eurobond Floating Q Price / Quantity
101 04/06/99 02/26/08 270,304 EUR Eurobond 8 A Price / Quantity
102 04/07/99 04/07/09 1,226,354 USD Global 11.75 S Price / Quantity
103 04/26/99 04/26/06 483,316 EUR Eurobond 9 A Price / Quantity
104 05/10/99 03/18/04 439,464 EUR Eurobond 7 A Price / Quantity
105 05/24/99 05/24/01 1,270,080 USD Domestic 9.5 S Quantity
56Issue Maturity Coupon Data
Bond Date Date Market Frequency Available Coupon
Amount Issued
 (USD Thousands) Currency
106 05/24/99 05/24/04 2,640,292 USD Domestic 11.25 S Quantity
107 05/26/99 05/26/09 694,155 EUR Eurobond 9 A Price / Quantity
108 06/10/99 06/10/02 208,677 EUR Eurobond 7.125 A Quantity
109 07/01/99 07/01/04 681,842 EUR Eurobond 8.5 A Price / Quantity
110 07/22/99 07/22/03 103,489 EUR Eurobond Floating S Quantity
111 08/11/99 08/11/09 158,724 JPY Eurobond 3.5 A Quantity
112 09/03/99 09/03/01 585,504 EUR Eurobond 8.5 A Price / Quantity
113 10/14/99 05/14/01 321,199 EUR Eurobond 7.3 Z Quantity
114 10/15/99 10/16/00 250,000 USD Global 0 Z Quantity
115 10/15/99 04/15/01 250,000 USD Global 0 Z Quantity
116 10/15/99 10/15/01 250,000 USD Global 0 Z Quantity
117 10/15/99 10/15/02 250,000 USD Global 0 Z Quantity
118 10/15/99 10/15/03 250,000 USD Global 0 Z Quantity
119 10/15/99 10/15/04 250,000 USD Global 0 Z Quantity
120 10/21/99 10/21/02 523,341 EUR Eurobond 9.25 A Quantity
121 11/12/99 11/10/00 1,141,458 USD Domestic 0 Z Price
122 11/19/99 02/26/08 1,488,544 EUR Eurobond 8 A Price / Quantity
123 11/26/99 11/26/03 260,308 EUR Eurobond 9.75 A Price / Quantity
124 12/07/99 12/07/04 412,672 EUR Eurobond 10 A Price / Quantity
125 12/09/99 12/07/04 101,792 EUR Eurobond 10 A Quantity
126 12/11/99 01/07/05 254,091 EUR Eurobond 10 A Quantity
127 12/17/99 12/17/03 183,135 JPY Eurobond 5.4 S Quantity
128 12/22/99 12/22/04 202,196 EUR Eurobond Floating Q Quantity
129 01/07/00 01/07/05 657,455 EUR Eurobond 10 A Price / Quantity
130 01/07/00 01/07/05 253,362 EUR Eurobond N.A. N.A. Quantity
131 01/26/00 01/26/07 776,156 EUR Eurobond 10.25 A Price / Quantity
132 02/03/00 02/01/20 1,250,000 USD Global 12 S Price / Quantity
133 02/21/00 05/21/03 1,684,938 USD Domestic 11.75 S Quantity
134 02/21/00 05/21/05 1,763,641 USD Domestic 12.125 S Quantity
135 03/15/00 03/15/10 1,000,000 USD Global 11.375 S Price / Quantity
136 03/17/00 03/16/01 1,109,683 USD Domestic 0 Z Price
137 04/04/00 10/04/04 479,039 EUR Eurobond 8.125 A Price / Quantity
138 05/24/00 05/24/05 674,068 EUR Eurobond 9 A Price / Quantity
139 06/14/00 06/14/04 561,979 JPY Eurobond 5.125 S Quantity
140 06/15/00 06/15/15 2,402,700 USD Global 11.75 S Price / Quantity
141 06/20/00 06/20/03 940,083 EUR Eurobond 9 A Price / Quantity
142 07/14/00 07/13/01 1,251,560 USD Domestic 0 Z Price
143 07/20/00 07/20/04 949,065 EUR Eurobond 9.25 A Price / Quantity
144 07/21/00 07/21/30 1,250,000 USD Global 10.25 S Price / Quantity
145 09/07/00 09/07/07 435,722 EUR Eurobond 10 A Price / Quantity
146 09/26/00 09/26/05 575,595 JPY Eurobond 4.85 S Quantity
147 11/10/00 11/09/01 1,000,979 USD Domestic 0 Z Price
148 02/21/01 02/21/12 1,593,951 USD Global 12.375 S Price / Quantity
149 02/22/01 02/22/07 300,000 USD Eurobond 11 S Price / Quantity
150 06/19/01 06/19/31 8,935,311 USD Global 12 S Price / Quantity
151 06/19/01 06/19/31 200,000 USD Eurobond 9.5 A Quantity
152 06/19/01 06/19/18 7,691,791 USD Global 12.25 S Price / Quantity
153 06/19/01 06/19/18 463,729 EUR Eurobond 10 A Quantity
1 10/15/88 10/15/99 670,000 USD Restructured Debt Floating S Price
2 08/31/89 09/15/13 1,000,000 USD Restructured Debt 6 S Price
3 11/26/92 01/01/01 7,104,960 USD Brady Bond Floating S Price
4 04/15/94 04/15/06 4,799,521 USD Brady Bond Floating S Price
5 04/15/94 04/15/09 1,737,355 USD Brady Bond Floating S Price
Brazil
57Issue Maturity Coupon Data
Bond Date Date Market Frequency Available Coupon
Amount Issued
 (USD Thousands) Currency
6 04/15/94 04/15/09 2,174,663 USD Brady Bond Floating S Price
7 04/15/94 04/15/14 7,387,519 USD Brady Bond 8 S Price
8 04/15/94 04/15/24 3,593,064 USD Brady Bond Floating S Price
9 04/15/94 04/15/24 10,631,926 USD Brady Bond Floating S Price
10 10/15/94 04/15/12 8,489,909 USD Brady Bond Floating S Price
11 06/19/95 06/19/97 946,415 JPY Eurobond 6 A Quantity
12 06/21/95 07/20/98 719,756 DM Eurobond 9 A Price / Quantity
13 10/19/95 01/06/01 70,715 DM Eurobond 10 A Price
14 03/22/96 03/22/01 283,509 JPY Eurobond 5.5 S Quantity
15 05/08/96 04/15/05 164,668 EUR Eurobond 11 A Price / Quantity
16 06/11/96 06/11/99 154,223 GBP Eurobond 9.75 A Quantity
17 10/09/96 09/15/07 1,281,699 USD Eurobond Floating S Quantity
18 11/05/96 11/05/01 750,000 USD Global 8.875 S Price / Quantity
19 02/05/97 02/26/07 601,900 EUR Eurobond 8 A Price / Quantity
20 02/26/97 02/26/07 590,338 EUR Eurobond 8 N.A. Quantity
21 04/25/97 05/21/02 174,124 EUR Eurobond 6.625 A Price / Quantity
22 04/30/97 05/21/02 208,699 EUR Eurobond 6.625 A Price / Quantity
23 05/07/97 05/21/02 166,905 EUR Eurobond 6.625 A Price / Quantity
24 06/03/97 06/26/17 442,219 EUR Eurobond 11 A Price / Quantity
25 06/09/97 05/15/27 3,500,000 USD Global 10.125 S Quantity
26 07/30/97 07/30/07 253,245 GBP Eurobond 10 A Quantity
27 03/03/98 03/03/03 538,100 EUR Eurobond 8.625 A Price / Quantity
28 04/06/98 04/07/08 1,000,000 USD Eurobond 0 Z Quantity
29 04/07/98 04/07/08 1,250,000 USD Global 9.375 S Quantity
30 04/23/98 04/23/08 413,289 DM Eurobond Step Down A Quantity
31 04/30/99 04/15/04 3,046,172 USD Global 11.625 S Price / Quantity
32 07/29/99 07/29/02 750,778 EUR Eurobond 9.5 A Quantity
33 09/10/99 09/30/04 523,596 EUR Eurobond 11.125 A Price / Quantity
34 10/25/99 10/15/09 4,000,000 USD Global 14.5 S Price / Quantity
35 10/29/99 11/17/06 735,812 EUR Eurobond 12 A Price / Quantity
36 11/13/99 11/26/01 606,366 EUR Eurobond 8.25 A Price / Quantity
37 01/15/00 02/04/10 741,988 EUR Eurobond 11 A Price / Quantity
38 01/26/00 01/15/20 1,000,000 USD Global 12.75 S Price / Quantity
39 03/06/00 03/06/30 1,000,000 USD Global 12.25 S Price / Quantity
40 06/21/00 07/05/05 709,622 EUR Eurobond 9 A Quantity
41 06/23/00 07/05/05 1,170,631 EUR Eurobond 9 A Price / Quantity
42 07/26/00 07/26/07 1,500,000 USD Global 11.25 S Price / Quantity
43 08/17/00 08/17/40 5,157,311 USD Global 11 S Price / Quantity
44 09/20/00 10/05/07 423,765 EUR Eurobond 9.5 A Price / Quantity
45 11/29/00 03/22/06 600,646 JPY Eurobond 4.75 S Quantity
46 01/10/01 01/24/11 937,124 EUR Eurobond 9.5 A Price / Quantity
47 01/11/01 01/11/06 1,500,000 USD Global 10.25 S Price / Quantity
48 03/17/01 04/10/07 651,090 JPY Eurobond 4.75 S Quantity
49 03/22/01 04/15/24 2,150,000 USD Global 8.875 S Price / Quantity
50 05/09/01 07/05/05 424,012 EUR Eurobond 9 A Quantity
51 05/17/01 07/15/05 1,000,000 USD Global 9.625 S Price / Quantity
52 08/02/01 08/28/03 177,576 JPY Eurobond 3.75 S Quantity
53 01/11/02 01/11/12 1,250,000 USD Global 11 S Price / Quantity
54 03/12/02 03/12/08 1,250,000 USD Global 11.5 S Quantity
55 04/02/02 04/02/09 445,859 EUR Eurobond 11.5 A Price / Quantity
56 04/16/02 04/15/10 1,000,000 USD Global 12 S Quantity
1 05/11/93 05/11/98 125,000 USD Eurobond 7.125 S Price / Quantity
2 01/14/94 01/14/99 89,678 JPY Eurobond 3.55 S Quantity
Colombia
58Issue Maturity Coupon Data
Bond Date Date Market Frequency Available Coupon
Amount Issued
 (USD Thousands) Currency
3 02/23/94 02/23/04 250,000 USD Yankee 7.25 S Price / Quantity
4 10/06/94 10/06/99 175,000 USD Yankee 8.75 S Price / Quantity
5 02/15/95 02/15/00 100,000 USD Eurobond 9.25 A Quantity
6 08/02/95 08/02/02 126,920 JPY Eurobond 4.1 S Quantity
7 11/28/95 12/21/00 104,113 DM Eurobond 7.25 A Price / Quantity
8 12/21/95 12/22/00 147,326 JPY Eurobond 3 S Quantity
9 02/15/96 02/15/03 200,000 USD Global 7.25 S Price / Quantity
10 02/15/96 02/15/16 200,000 USD Global 8.7 S Price / Quantity
11 06/13/96 06/14/01 400,000 USD Eurobond 8 A Price / Quantity
12 10/07/96 10/07/16 125,000 USD Eurobond 8.66 S Quantity
13 11/21/96 11/21/01 181,916 DM Eurobond Floating Q Quantity
14 02/24/97 02/15/07 750,000 USD Global 7.625 S Price / Quantity
15 02/24/97 02/15/27 250,000 USD Global 8.375 S Price / Quantity
16 02/11/98 02/11/08 164,830 GBP Eurobond 9.75 A Quantity
17 03/06/98 03/06/02 222,433 ITL Eurobond 7 A Quantity
18 04/02/98 04/01/08 500,000 USD Global 8.625 S Price / Quantity
19 06/15/98 06/15/03 150,000 USD Private Placement 7.27 S Quantity
20 06/25/98 06/15/03 150,000 USD Eurobond 7.27 S Price / Quantity
21 07/14/98 07/14/03 135,000 USD Eurobond 7.7 S Price / Quantity
22 08/13/98 08/13/05 500,000 USD Yankee Floating Q Quantity
23 03/09/99 03/09/04 500,000 USD Global 10.875 S Price / Quantity
24 04/23/99 04/23/09 500,000 USD Global 9.75 S Price / Quantity
25 11/30/99 04/25/05 500,000 USD Eurobond 9.75 N.A. Quantity
26 11/30/99 04/23/09 500,000 USD Global 9.75 S Quantity
27 02/25/00 02/25/20 1,075,000 USD Global 11.75 S Price / Quantity
28 03/17/00 03/09/28 22,285 USD Global 11.85 S Quantity
29 06/09/00 06/30/03 427,948 EUR Eurobond 11 A Price / Quantity
30 07/28/00 06/30/03 139,210 EUR Eurobond 11 A Quantity
31 10/05/00 10/20/05 513,629 EUR Eurobond 11.25 A Price / Quantity
32 10/13/00 10/17/05 300,000 USD Eurobond Floating Q Quantity
33 10/20/00 10/20/05 252,786 EUR Eurobond 11.25 A Quantity
34 01/25/01 01/31/08 648,145 EUR Eurobond 11.375 A Price / Quantity
35 04/09/01 04/09/11 875,000 USD Global 9.75 S Quantity
36 04/12/01 04/27/05 243,041 JPY Eurobond 5.5 S Quantity
37 05/12/01 05/31/11 344,828 EUR Eurobond 11.5 A Price / Quantity
38 06/13/01 06/13/06 450,000 USD Global 10.5 S Price / Quantity
39 11/21/01 01/23/12 900,000 USD Global 10 S Price / Quantity
40 07/09/02 07/09/10 507,029 USD Global 10.5 S Quantity
41 12/09/02 01/15/13 625,000 USD Global 10.75 S Quantity
1 03/28/90 12/31/19 1,516,473 EUR Brady Bond 5.01 S Price
2 03/13/91 03/13/96 187,243 DM Eurobond 10.5 A Quantity
3 07/16/91 07/16/01 150,000 USD Eurobond 9.5 S Quantity
4 08/21/91 08/21/96 91,747 ESP Eurobond 14.25 A Quantity
5 09/29/91 09/01/08 96,500 GBP Eurobond 16.5 S Quantity
6 12/03/91 12/03/98 182,252 GBP Eurobond 12.25 A Quantity
7 09/24/92 09/15/02 250,000 USD Yankee 8.5 S Price / Quantity
8 03/16/93 03/16/98 200,000 USD Eurobond 7.25 A Price / Quantity
9 04/02/93 08/12/00 58,895 USD Eurobond 6.97 S Price
10 07/23/93 07/23/96 92,825 JPY Eurobond 4.9 S Quantity
11 01/25/95 01/29/03 846,891 EUR Eurobond 10.375 A Price / Quantity
12 07/20/95 07/21/97 1,000,000 USD Eurobond Floating S Price
13 07/21/95 07/21/97 418,403 USD Eurobond Step Down A Quantity
14 08/17/95 08/17/98 1,057,666 JPY Eurobond 5 A Quantity
Mexico
59Issue Maturity Coupon Data
Bond Date Date Market Frequency Available Coupon
Amount Issued
 (USD Thousands) Currency
15 10/05/95 11/02/00 705,975 DM Eurobond 9.375 A Price / Quantity
16 12/05/95 11/27/96 1,500,000 USD Eurobond 0 Z Quantity
17 12/12/95 03/12/97 294,652 JPY Eurobond 2.85 A Quantity
18 12/12/95 12/12/97 127,683 JPY Eurobond 3 A Quantity
19 01/29/96 01/29/03 684,158 DM Eurobond 10.375 A Quantity
20 02/06/96 02/06/01 1,000,000 USD Global 9.75 S Price / Quantity
21 05/07/96 05/15/26 1,750,000 USD Global 11.5 S Price / Quantity
22 06/06/96 06/06/06 918,628 JPY Eurobond 6.75 S Quantity
23 09/10/96 09/10/04 1,002,904 DM Eurobond Step Up A Quantity
24 09/24/96 09/15/16 1,200,000 USD Global 11.375 S Price / Quantity
25 09/30/96 09/30/02 637,841 JPY Eurobond 5 N.A. Quantity
26 11/21/96 11/21/01 330,447 ITL Eurobond Floating Q Quantity
27 01/14/97 01/15/07 1,250,000 USD Global 9.875 S Price / Quantity
28 01/14/97 01/15/07 500,000 USD Eurobond 9.875 S Quantity
29 02/05/97 02/24/09 902,850 EUR Eurobond 8.25 A Price / Quantity
30 02/20/97 02/20/07 302,076 EUR Eurobond 9.125 A Price / Quantity
31 02/24/97 02/24/09 885,506 EUR Eurobond 8.25 A Quantity
32 03/11/97 03/11/04 407,692 JPY Eurobond 4 N.A. Quantity
33 04/24/97 04/24/02 796,761 JPY Eurobond 3.1 N.A. Quantity
34 05/08/97 05/08/17 297,195 ITL Eurobond 11 A Quantity
35 05/30/97 05/30/02 489,966 GBP Eurobond 8.75 A Quantity
36 06/27/97 06/27/02 1,000,000 USD Eurobond Floating Q Quantity
37 07/16/97 07/16/04 286,671 ITL Eurobond 8.375 A Quantity
38 07/23/97 07/23/08 418,543 DM Eurobond 8 A Quantity
39 09/10/97 10/01/04 446,235 EUR Eurobond 7.625 A Price / Quantity
40 10/29/97 06/02/03 360,573 CAD Global 7 S Quantity
41 03/12/98 03/12/08 1,250,000 USD Global 8.625 S Price / Quantity
42 06/08/98 06/08/03 100,867 PTE Eurobond Floating S Quantity
43 02/19/99 02/17/09 1,250,000 USD Global 10.375 S Price / Quantity
44 04/06/99 04/06/05 1,000,000 USD Global 9.75 S Price / Quantity
45 04/07/99 04/07/00 227,952 USD Eurobond Floating S Quantity
46 04/07/99 04/07/04 500,000 USD Eurobond Floating Q Price
47 04/07/99 04/07/04 394,926 EUR Eurobond Floating Q Quantity
48 06/23/99 07/06/06 420,643 EUR Global 7.375 A Price / Quantity
49 01/28/00 02/01/10 1,500,000 USD Global 9.875 S Price / Quantity
50 03/02/00 03/08/10 966,277 EUR Eurobond 7.5 A Price / Quantity
51 08/01/00 02/01/06 1,500,000 USD Global 8.5 S Price / Quantity
52 09/20/00 09/29/04 467,158 JPY Eurobond 2.25 S Quantity
53 01/16/01 01/14/11 1,500,000 USD Global 8.375 S Price / Quantity
54 03/13/01 03/13/08 659,805 EUR Eurobond 7.375 A Quantity
55 03/30/01 12/30/19 3,300,000 USD Global 8.125 S Price / Quantity
56 08/13/01 08/15/31 3,250,000 USD Global 8.3 S Price / Quantity
57 01/14/02 01/14/12 1,250,000 USD Global 7.5 S Price / Quantity
58 09/24/02 09/24/22 1,750,000 USD Global 8 S Quantity
1 05/14/93 05/14/94 266,000 USD Domestic 3 A Quantity
2 05/14/93 05/14/96 1,518,000 USD Domestic 3 A Quantity
3 05/14/93 05/14/99 1,307,000 USD Domestic 3 A Quantity
4 05/14/93 05/14/03 2,627,000 USD Domestic 3 A Price / Quantity
5 05/14/93 05/14/08 2,502,000 USD Domestic 3 A Price / Quantity
6 05/14/96 05/14/06 1,750,000 USD Domestic 3 A Price / Quantity
7 05/14/96 05/14/11 1,750,000 USD Domestic 3 A Price / Quantity
8 11/27/96 11/27/01 1,000,000 USD Eurobond 9.25 S Price / Quantity
9 03/13/97 03/25/04 1,177,126 EUR Eurobond 9 A Price / Quantity
Russia
60Issue Maturity Coupon Data
Bond Date Date Market Frequency Available Coupon
Amount Issued
 (USD Thousands) Currency
10 03/19/97 03/19/15 58,932 DM Eurobond Floating A Quantity
11 03/25/97 03/25/04 1,187,936 EUR Eurobond 9 A Quantity
12 06/26/97 06/26/07 2,400,000 USD Private Placement 10 S Price
13 06/26/97 06/26/07 2,400,000 USD Eurobond 10 S Price / Quantity
14 12/06/97 12/06/99 50,000 USD Eurobond Floating N.A. Quantity
15 03/12/98 03/12/18 54,744 DM Eurobond Step Down A Quantity
16 03/31/98 03/31/05 680,108 EUR Eurobond 9.375 A Price / Quantity
17 03/31/98 03/31/05 687,815 EUR Eurobond 9.375 A Quantity
18 04/24/98 04/30/03 418,403 EUR Eurobond 9 A Price / Quantity
19 06/10/98 06/10/03 1,250,000 USD Private Placement 11.75 S Price / Quantity
20 06/10/98 06/10/03 1,250,000 USD Eurobond 11.75 S Price / Quantity
21 06/24/98 06/24/08 150,000 USD Eurobond 12.75 N.A. Quantity
22 06/24/98 06/24/28 2,500,000 USD Private Placement 12.75 S Price / Quantity
23 06/24/98 06/24/28 2,500,000 USD Eurobond 12.75 S Price / Quantity
24 07/24/98 07/24/05 2,968,968 USD Private Placement 8.75 S Price
25 07/24/98 07/24/05 2,968,967 USD Eurobond 8.75 S Price / Quantity
26 07/24/98 07/24/18 3,466,671 USD Private Placement 11 S Price
27 07/24/98 07/24/18 3,466,671 USD Eurobond 11 S Price / Quantity
28 02/01/00 11/14/07 1,322,000 USD Domestic 3 S Price
29 03/31/00 03/31/30 1,840,000 USD Private Placement Step Up S Quantity
30 03/31/00 03/31/30 1,840,000 USD Eurobond Step Up S Quantity
31 08/25/00 03/31/10 2,534,000 USD Private Placement 8.25 S Price
32 08/25/00 03/31/10 2,534,000 USD Eurobond 8.25 S Price / Quantity
1 01/01/50 02/06/03 1,000,000 EUR Eurobond 7.25 A Price
2 12/22/88 12/22/98 150,000 USD Eurobond 11.125 A Price / Quantity
3 04/27/89 04/27/99 200,000 USD Eurobond 11.5 S Price / Quantity
4 06/07/89 06/07/99 280,000 USD Eurobond 5.5 A Price / Quantity
5 09/14/89 09/14/99 200,000 USD Eurobond 10.25 S Quantity
6 11/22/89 11/22/95 250,000 USD Eurobond 9.75 N.A. Quantity
7 02/21/90 03/15/97 200,000 USD Eurobond 10.75 A Price / Quantity
8 04/04/90 04/24/97 147,001 DM Eurobond 10 A Price
9 08/16/90 08/16/95 150,000 USD Eurobond 10.375 N.A. Quantity
10 10/28/91 10/28/96 328,235 DM Eurobond 10.75 A Price / Quantity
11 03/03/92 03/20/97 250,000 USD Eurobond 8.5 S Price / Quantity
12 06/25/92 06/15/99 250,000 USD Eurobond 9 S Price / Quantity
13 07/06/92 07/27/99 268,294 DM Eurobond 10.25 A Price / Quantity
14 07/16/92 08/06/97 200,000 USD Eurobond 8.125 A Price / Quantity
15 09/24/92 09/24/99 407,432 JPY Eurobond 6.8 N.A. Quantity
16 01/19/93 02/18/00 243,665 DM Eurobond 9.5 A Price / Quantity
17 02/25/93 02/25/00 826,720 JPY Eurobond 6.3 S Quantity
18 06/10/93 06/10/03 326,067 JPY Eurobond 7 N.A. Quantity
19 06/28/93 07/09/03 585,783 EUR Eurobond 8.75 A Price / Quantity
20 10/19/93 10/29/98 610,493 DM Eurobond 7.25 A Price / Quantity
21 10/27/93 10/27/03 187,481 GBP Eurobond 9 A Quantity
22 11/30/93 11/30/98 278,287 JPY Eurobond 4 S Quantity
23 11/30/93 11/30/01 463,811 JPY Eurobond 5.1 S Quantity
24 03/01/94 03/01/02 428,006 JPY Eurobond 5.45 N.A. Quantity
25 03/01/94 03/01/04 286,766 JPY Eurobond 5.75 S Quantity
26 07/25/95 08/21/98 345,994 DM Eurobond 8 A Price / Quantity
27 07/27/95 07/27/98 573,254 JPY Eurobond 4.5 S Quantity
28 09/19/95 10/05/98 300,000 USD Eurobond 8.75 S Price / Quantity
29 11/06/95 05/06/05 263,350 USD Eurobond 3 S Price / Quantity
30 01/16/96 02/16/06 94,793 JPY Eurobond 7.2 A Quantity
Turkey
61Issue Maturity Coupon Data
Bond Date Date Market Frequency Available Coupon
Amount Issued
 (USD Thousands) Currency
31 02/05/96 02/14/01 341,041 DM Eurobond 7.5 A Price / Quantity
32 04/23/96 04/23/01 697,913 JPY Eurobond 5.7 S Quantity
33 05/22/96 06/11/99 500,000 USD Eurobond 8.25 S Price / Quantity
34 05/30/96 05/30/02 281,833 JPY Eurobond 6 A Quantity
35 08/13/96 09/04/00 431,656 DM Eurobond 8 A Price / Quantity
36 12/05/96 12/05/01 483,406 DM Eurobond 7.625 A Price / Quantity
37 01/29/97 02/17/04 301,397 DM Eurobond 7.75 A Price / Quantity
38 02/24/97 03/18/02 177,144 EUR Eurobond 9 A Price / Quantity
39 03/14/97 06/26/03 57,626 DM Eurobond 8.5 A Quantity
40 05/20/97 05/23/02 400,000 USD Eurobond 10 S Price / Quantity
41 06/03/97 06/24/02 578,935 DM Eurobond 7.25 A Price / Quantity
42 08/18/97 08/18/00 100,000 USD Eurobond Floating S Quantity
43 09/17/97 09/19/07 600,000 USD Eurobond 10 S Price / Quantity
44 09/19/97 09/19/07 600,000 USD Private Placement 10 S Quantity
45 10/10/97 10/22/07 1,285,709 EUR Eurobond 8.125 A Price / Quantity
46 02/06/98 02/06/03 551,222 DM Eurobond 7.25 A Quantity
47 02/13/98 02/23/05 400,000 USD Private Placement 9.875 S Price / Quantity
48 02/13/98 02/23/05 450,000 USD Eurobond 9.875 S Price / Quantity
49 04/20/98 04/20/06 552,154 DM Eurobond Step Down A Quantity
50 05/12/98 05/12/03 300,000 USD Eurobond 8.875 S Price / Quantity
51 11/20/98 11/30/01 475,737 DM Eurobond 9.5 A Price / Quantity
52 12/11/98 12/15/08 600,000 USD Eurobond 12 S Price / Quantity
53 12/15/98 12/15/03 200,000 USD Eurobond 12 N.A. Quantity
54 02/06/99 02/17/03 449,102 DM Eurobond 9.25 A Price / Quantity
55 02/25/99 03/15/04 1,105,154 EUR Eurobond 9.5 A Price / Quantity
56 06/19/99 06/15/09 1,250,000 USD Eurobond 12.375 S Price / Quantity
57 08/05/99 08/25/05 427,656 EUR Eurobond 9.625 A Price / Quantity
58 10/30/99 11/05/04 500,000 USD Eurobond 11.875 S Price / Quantity
59 11/13/99 11/30/06 773,914 EUR Eurobond 9.625 A Price / Quantity
60 12/03/99 12/17/02 404,000 EUR Eurobond 7.75 A Price / Quantity
61 01/11/00 01/15/30 1,500,000 USD Eurobond 11.875 S Price / Quantity
62 01/27/00 02/09/10 977,359 EUR Eurobond 9.25 A Price / Quantity
63 03/31/00 04/14/05 561,209 EUR Eurobond 7.75 A Price / Quantity
64 06/09/00 06/15/10 1,500,000 USD Eurobond 11.75 S Price / Quantity
65 06/13/00 06/13/03 474,809 EUR Eurobond Floating Q Quantity
66 06/15/00 06/15/10 750,000 USD Eurobond 11.75 N.A. Quantity
67 06/17/00 07/14/04 516,674 JPY Eurobond 3.25 S Quantity
68 08/07/00 08/07/03 177,949 EUR Eurobond Floating S Quantity
69 11/07/00 11/27/03 467,022 JPY Eurobond 3 S Quantity
70 01/31/01 02/16/04 697,492 EUR Eurobond 8.25 A Price / Quantity
71 10/24/01 02/07/05 713,349 EUR Eurobond 11 A Price / Quantity
72 11/21/01 11/27/06 1,000,000 USD Eurobond 11.375 S Price / Quantity
73 01/17/02 01/23/12 1,000,000 USD Eurobond 11.5 S Price / Quantity
74 03/13/02 03/19/08 600,000 USD Eurobond 9.875 S Price / Quantity
75 04/19/02 05/08/07 614,058 EUR Eurobond 9.75 A Price / Quantity
76 05/14/02 05/14/07 200,000 USD Eurobond 11.5 S Quantity
77 11/13/02 01/13/08 1,100,000 USD Eurobond 10.5 S Quantity
78 01/14/03 01/14/13 1,500,000 USD Eurobond 11 S Quantity
79 01/24/03 01/24/08 535,720 EUR Eurobond 9.875 A Quantity
1 04/23/93 04/23/98 100,000 USD Eurobond 7.5 S Quantity
2 03/07/94 03/07/01 100,000 USD Eurobond 7.25 S Quantity
3 10/24/94 04/24/97 101,604 JPY Eurobond 5 S Quantity
4 08/08/95 09/08/00 136,774 DM Eurobond 8 A Price / Quantity
Uruguay
62Issue Maturity Coupon Data
Bond Date Date Market Frequency Available Coupon
Amount Issued
 (USD Thousands) Currency
5 09/19/96 09/26/06 100,000 USD Eurobond 8.375 S Price / Quantity
6 09/20/96 09/26/06 100,000 USD Private Placement 8.375 S Quantity
7 04/24/97 04/24/02 79,676 JPY Eurobond 2.5 N.A. Quantity
8 07/09/97 07/15/27 510,000 USD Eurobond 7.875 S Price / Quantity
9 04/06/98 04/07/08 250,000 USD Eurobond 7 S Price / Quantity
10 11/14/98 11/18/03 175,000 USD Eurobond 7.875 S Price / Quantity
11 04/30/99 05/04/09 250,000 USD Eurobond 7.25 S Price / Quantity
12 06/20/00 06/22/10 300,000 USD Eurobond 8.75 S Price / Quantity
13 09/13/00 09/26/05 196,824 EUR Eurobond 7 A Price / Quantity
14 11/23/00 05/29/07 156,149 CLP Eurobond Floating S Quantity
15 02/27/01 03/14/06 257,023 JPY Eurobond Step Up S Quantity
16 06/08/01 06/28/11 170,032 EUR Eurobond 7 A Price / Quantity
17 11/20/01 01/20/12 355,000 USD Eurobond 7.625 S Price / Quantity
18 03/25/02 03/25/09 250,000 USD Eurobond 7.875 S Quantity
1 11/14/88 11/14/93 60,606 DM Eurobond 8.25 A Price
2 12/22/88 12/22/98 167,000 USD Eurobond Floating S Price
3 12/22/88 12/30/03 167,000 USD Eurobond Floating S Price
4 12/18/90 03/30/20 329,059 EUR Brady Bond 6.66 S Price
5 12/18/90 03/31/20 719,600 USD Brady Bond 6.75 S Price
6 08/21/91 09/11/96 150,000 USD Eurobond 9.75 A Price / Quantity
7 09/18/91 12/18/07 100,000 USD Restructured Debt 9 S Quantity
8 11/18/91 12/02/96 127,429 DM Eurobond 10.5 A Price / Quantity
9 12/18/92 12/18/07 30,000 USD Private Placement 8.75 S Quantity
10 03/08/93 03/11/96 150,000 USD Eurobond 9.125 S Price / Quantity
11 05/05/93 05/05/98 155,661 DM Eurobond 10.25 A Price / Quantity
12 05/11/93 05/27/96 150,000 USD Eurobond 9 S Price / Quantity
13 09/13/93 09/20/95 250,000 USD Eurobond 6.75 S Price / Quantity
14 09/16/93 10/15/00 183,148 DM Eurobond 8.75 A Price / Quantity
15 09/20/93 09/20/95 50,000 USD Eurobond Floating N.A. Quantity
16 12/07/93 12/07/95 83,155 ATS Eurobond 8 N.A. Quantity
17 12/14/95 12/14/98 347,044 DM Eurobond 10 A Price / Quantity
18 09/12/96 10/04/03 427,590 EUR Eurobond 10.25 A Price / Quantity
19 06/10/97 06/18/07 315,000 USD Global 9.125 S Price / Quantity
20 06/10/97 06/18/07 315,000 USD Private Placement 9.125 S Price / Quantity
21 09/11/97 09/15/27 4,000,000 USD Global 9.25 S Price / Quantity
22 07/31/98 08/15/18 500,000 USD Eurobond 13.625 S Price / Quantity
23 10/29/98 10/29/08 109,532 DM Eurobond Step Up A Quantity
24 12/23/99 12/23/02 190,762 EUR Eurobond 9.875 A Quantity
25 03/03/00 03/23/05 481,554 EUR Eurobond 10.5 A Price / Quantity
26 02/09/01 03/05/08 550,785 EUR Eurobond 11 A Price / Quantity
27 03/05/01 03/05/08 181,830 EUR Eurobond 11 A Quantity
28 06/28/01 07/25/11 213,613 EUR Eurobond 11.125 A Price / Quantity
29 12/07/01 06/30/03 222,892 EUR Eurobond 10.5 A Price / Quantity
The table describes the emerging market bonds used in the paper by country. For the currency, ATS stands for Austrian schilling,
CAD for Canadian dollar, CHF for Swiss franc, CLP for Chilean peso, DM for Deutsche mark, ESP for Spanish peseta, EUR for
Euro, FRF for French franc, GBP for British pound, ITL for Italian lira, JPY for Japanese yen, NLG for Dutch guilder, PTE for
Portuguese escudo, and USD for U.S. dollar. For the coupon frequency, A stands for annual, M for monthly, Q for quarterly, S for
semi-annual, Z for zero-coupon bond, and N.A. for not available. The last column of the table reports whether the bond is used in the
price section, in the quantity section, or in both sections of the paper.
Venezuela
63